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THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA DIVORCE CODE
LYNNE
JACK

Z.
A.

GOLD-BIKINt
ROUNICKfI

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE ENACTMENT OF THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA DIVORCE CODE (Code)' has effected sweeping reform of the
Commonwealth's antiquated laws dealing with the marital relationship. 2 Previously, Pennsylvania had been one of three states requiring only fault grounds for divorce. 3 Moreover, as of 1980, it was the
only state in the nation which allowed neither alimony nor post4
divorce distribution of' marital property.
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1. Divorce Code, Act No. 1980-26, §§ 101-802, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 49 [hereinafter cited
as DIVORCE CODE]. The new Code became effective in Pennsylvania on July 1, 1980. DIVORCE
CODE § 802.2. Pennsylvania's divorce laws prior to the new Divorce Code had remained essentially
unchanged since 1785. See generally Teitelbaum, The Pennsylvania Divorce Law, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, Commentary at 343-60 (Purdon 1955). This commentary which precedes the
codified version of Pennsylvania's old divorce laws gives a brief synopsis of the historical development of those laws. See id. While the old laws have been repealed by the new Code, the
commentary still has historical and analytical value. It is hoped that it will not be lost in subsequent recodifications.
3. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1955) (repealed 1980). The other two states
retaining only fault grounds are Illinois and South Dakota. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 301
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25042 (1976). For a state-by-state
breakdown of divorce laws in the United States, see Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty
States: An Overview as of August 1, 1979, 5 Fain. L. Rep. 4027 (1979).
4. See Freed & Foster, supra note 3, at 4029; Morrissey, A Pennsylvania Primer for
Alimony and Equitable Distribution, 47 PA. B.A.Q. 503, 504 & n.12 (1978). Permanent alimony
after divorce from the bonds of matrimony (i.e., divorce "a vinculo matrimonii" or "AVM") was
available in Pennsvlvania only if the divorced spouse was insane. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
45 (Purdon 1955) (repealed 1980). See also Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 458 Pa. 147, 156-58, 329
A.2d 483, 488-89 (1974); Commonwealth v. Scholl, 156 Pa. Super. Ct. 136, 137-38, 39 A.2d
719, 720 (1944). Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (repealed 1980) (providing for alimony pendente lite); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 47 (Purdon 1955) (repealed 1980)
(alimony available after divorce from bed and board, i.e., a qualified divorce in which the parties separate but the marriage is not dissolved); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 48 (Purdon Supp.
1980) (repealed 1980) (permanent support allowance available for dependent spouse who is
either seriously mentally ill or insane).
Now that Pennsylvania allows alimony after divorce "AVM," Texas is the only state in the
union where such alimonv is not available. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (Vernon
1975). In Texas, however, the harshness of the rule prohibiting post-divorce alimony is somewhat mitigated by the fact that Texas is a community property jurisdiction. See id. §§ 5.01-02.

(617)
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The divorce reform legislation thus attempts to bring Pennsylvania into the mainstream of American jurisdictions which adhere to
more modern and realistic views of marriage and divorce. 5 Toward
this end, the Pennsylvania Legislature has adopted a Code which
contains no-fault provisions, 6 provisions for alimony, 7 and provisions
for equitable distribution of marital property. 8
These provisions, however, are not without ambiguity. Thus, the
approach of this article will be to take the practitioner through the
major sections of the Code thereby attempting to discern the Act's
meaning and ultimate impact. 9 The framework for this analysis will
be a comparison of the new Code with the laws of the contiguous
states of Delaware, New Jersey, and Ohio which have adopted conparable legislation. 10
II.

THE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA

A. Grounds for Divorce and the Elimination
of the Fault Requirement
1. Prior Law
The most pronounced change in terms of grounds for divorce in
the new Code is that it is no longer necessary for the party seeking
the divorce to show that the other party was at fault. 11 Previously,

Community property is generally%defined as all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage. See Hisquiendo v. Hisquiendo, 439 U.S. 572, 579 (1979). By statute, some property

acquired during the marriage may remain separate property. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
tit. 1, § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975). For a comparison of divorce in community property jurisdictions
with divorce in common law jurisdictions, see Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of
the Community Property and Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13
CREIGIIrON L. REx'. 71, 97-104 (1979). See also notes 53-62 and accompanying text infra.
5. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102(a)(1). This section specifically states that it is
the policy of the Commonwealth to "[m]ake the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for
dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience." Id.
6. See id. § 201. For a discussion of the no-fault aspect of the new Code, see notes 26-48
and accompanying text infra.
7. See DIVORcE CODE, supra note 1, §§ 501-507. For a discussion of the pertinent alimony
provisions, see notes 86-92 and accompanying text infra.
8. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, §§ 401-404. For a discussion of equitable distribution
under the new Code, see notes 63-79 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 26-48, 86-87, & 63-392 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1501-1533 (1975, Supp. 1978 & Interim Supp.
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-1 to -27 (West 1952 & Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3105.01-.21 (Anderson 1980). While the judicial interpretations of the divorce acts of sister
states are certainly not binding on the Pennsylvania courts in applying Pennsylvania law, those
decisions may be persuasive authority. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. National Bank & Trust Co.,
469 Pa. 188, 192-94, 364 A.2d 1331, 1334 (1976); In re Penn-Lehigh Corp., 191 Pa. Super. Ct.
649, 653-54, 159 A.2d 56, 59 (1960).
11. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(b)-(d).
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Pennsylvania law required that the party seeking divorce be "injured
and innocent" and that the other spouse be at fault (i.e., have done
something which would be considered the cause of the divorce under
the statute). 12 The old statute delineated the following as grounds
for divorce: impotency, bigamy, adultery, desertion for two years,
cruel and barbarous treatment, indignities, fraud, duress or coercion
in the procurement of marriage, and conviction of a felony with a
resulting sentence of at least two years imprisonment.13
As a result of the concomitant requirements that the petitioner
spouse be injured and innocent and that the respondent spouse be at
fault, few truly contested divorces were granted. 14 Petitioner
spouses simply could not meet the burden which these requirements
imposed. 15 This should not be surprising when one recognizes that
in almost any marriage each partner is capable of listing a string of
indignities allegedly performed by the other, thus removing that
spouse from the status of innocent and injured. However, like
Diogenes in his search for an honest man, 16 the courts eventually
recognized the impossibility of finding a spouse who was totally free
from fault 17 and, thus, granted a divorce to the more innocent and
injured of the two parties.' 8 As many courts have stated of the "at
fault" and "injured and innocent spouse" requirements, "t]o be innocent and injured, a spouse need not be totally free from fault."19
Therefore, despite the judicial recognition that a truly innocent
spouse existed only in fantasy, there was still great difficulty in obtaining a contested divorce in Pennsylvania. 20 As a result, the majority of divorces were granted as "uncontested" -after lengthy periods of
negotiation between the parties concerning child custody, property
rights, support, etc. 21 In order to meet the statutory requirements
12. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1955 & Supp. 1980) (repealed 1980).
13. Id. § 10(t) (repealed 1980). For a discussion of the existing fault grounds under the new
Code, see notes 36-49 and accompanying text infra.

14. See Morrissey, supra note 4, at 505-06.
15. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Albrecht, 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 626, 633, 109 A.2d 209, 212 (1954);
Wasson v. Wasson, 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 538, 108 A.2d 836, 838 (1954).
16. R. H0iSTAD, CYNIC HERO AND CYNIC KING (1949).
17. See Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL. L. REV. 377, 383-84 (1937).
18. See, e.g., Rensch v. Rensch, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 298, 381 A.2d 925, 927 (1977);
Sells v. Sells, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 335-36, 323 A.2d 20, 22 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Rensch v. Rensch, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 298, 381 A.2d 925, 927 (1977);
Bonawitz v. Bonawitz, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 257, 263, 369 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1976); Gray v. Gray,
220 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, 147, 286 A.2d 684, 687 (1971); Eifert v. Eifert, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 373,
375 n.2, 281 A.2d 657, 658 n.2 (1971); Murphy v. Murphy, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 576, 578, 205
A.2d 647, 649 (1964).
20. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
21. See Morrissey, supra note 4, at 505-06. Since there was no alimony or equitable distribution of marital property under the old divorce act, these considerations often provided
fertile subjects for negotiation in uncontested divorces. Id.
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for divorce, however, it became generally recognized that in most
cases the parties were forced to exacerbate petty marital wrongs in
their testimony.2 2 In many cases, they chose not to contest the ac23
tion at all.
In our research we have been unable to find statistics which indicate how many unhappy spouses fled Pennsylvania to states with
less harsh divorce laws. 24 It is clear, however, that if an uncontested
divorce could not be negotiated in the Commonwealth, migratory divorce was a viable option, for Pennsylvania could only be described as
a fault island in a no-fault sea.25
2. The New Code
The new Divorce Code now provides that a court can grant a
divorce if the marriage is determined to be "irretrievably broken." 26
Irretrievable breakdown is defined in the Code as "[e]strangement
due to marital difficulties with no reasonable prospect of reconciliation." 27
Where a spouse alleges irretrievable breakdown, a court may
grant the divorce after ninety days from the filing of the complaint if
the other spouse consents. 28 The Code also provides that, at the
request of either party, the court must order marital counseling sessions (up to a maximum of three) to take place within the ninety-day
29
period.
If" after one spouse files a complaint alleging irretrievable breakdown, the other fails to consent or denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken, a different procedure for divorce applies. The Code
provides that if the complaining party files an affidavit alleging that he
22. See Note, The Ohio Divorce Reforms of 1974, 25 CASE W.L. REV. 844, 850 (1975).
23. See id.; Morrissey, supra note 4, at 505-06.
24. See R. CRAMrON, 1). CURRIE & 1-. KAY,

CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS

ON CON-

FLICT OF LAWS 752 (2d ed. 1975) (in states where there are harsh grounds, the escapist impulse
is only human).
25. As a practical matter, many lawyers recognized that the emotional trauma and financial
outlay which accompanied a contested divorce rarely justified the results. As one marriage
counselor has stated of contested divorces: "[Tihere is a far greater amount of anger between

the parties at the end of the legal proceedings than there was actually at the time they made
the decision to divorce." Note, supra note 22, at 851, quoting Hearings on Domestic Relations
Bejore the Assembly Interim Comm. on Judiciary, California Assembly 42 (Jan. 8-9, 1964).
Therefore, due to the short residency requirements in contiguous states, migratory divorce was
often a realistic alternative. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1504(a) (Supp. 1978) (six
months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-10 (West Supp. 1979-1980) (one year); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 231 (McKinney 1977) (no minimum time; domicile within state at the commencement of
action is sufficent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.03 (Page 1980) (six months).
26. Setc DIVoiCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(c)-(d).

27. Id. § 104.
28. Id. § 201(c).
29. Id. § 202(b).
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or she has lived "separate and apart" from the other spouse for at
least three years, the court may grant the divorce so long as the allegations in the affidavit are not denied. 30 If those allegations are denied, the court may still dissolve the marriage after a hearing on the
questions of whether the marriage is irretrievably broken and
whether the parties have, in fact, lived "separate and apart," 3 1 a
phrase which the Code defines as "complete cessation of cohabitation." 32 After this hearing, as an alternative to granting the divorce,
if the court finds that there is a reasonable prospect of reconciliation,
it can continue the matter while the parties seek counseling. 3 3 The
continuation must be for a period of at least ninety but not for more
than 120 days. 34 After this period, if one party still alleges irretrievable breakdown, then the court may grant the divorce, even over the
defendant's opposition, upon the court's determination that the mar35
riage is irretrievably broken.
In addition to the irretrievable breakdown grounds, the Code
retains the traditional fault grounds. 36 These fault grounds are desertion for one year, cruel and barbarous treatment, bigamy, conviction
of a crime accompanied by a two-year prison sentence, and indignities. 3 7 The Code also retains the existing common law defenses to
38
these grounds.
Thus, a radical change has occurred in Pennsylvania law. It is a
change which brings this Commonwealth into modern times as well
as into the mainstream of American jurisprudence. Prior to July 1,
1980, Pennsylvania was one of only three states requiring fault for a
divorce. 3 9 A brief survey indicates that, with the passage of the
Code, Pennsylvania has joined thirty-four other jurisdictions which
permit divorce on grounds no more stringent than irretrievable

30. Id.§ 201(d)(1)(i).
31. Id.§ 201(d)(1)(ii).
32. Id. § 104.
33. ld. § 201(d)(2).
34. Id.
35. Id. As a practical matter, it is hard to imagine a court not finding the marriage to be
irretrievably broken after a three-year separation.

36. Two former fault grounds, fraud and duress, have become grounds for annulment. Id. §
205(a)(5).

37. Id. Notice that the desertion provision in the new Code provides for a one-year standard, whereas under the old law, the standard was two years. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
10(1) (Purdon 1955 & Supp. 1980) (repealed 1980); note 13 and accompanying text supra.
38. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 207. The defenses of condonation, connivance, collusion, recrimination and provocation, however, are not applicable to a no-fault divorce. Id. For a
discussion of these defenses, see A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, PENNSYLVANIA FAIILY LAW
§ 3.3 (1978).
39. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Outline, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297, 313 (1978).
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breakdown. 40 Twenty jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, allow
divorce if the parties have lived "separate and apart" for a defined
period. 4 l Additionally, with the passage of the Code, Pennsylvania
joins six other states where divorce can le granted upon mutual con42
sent of the parties.
Although the Commonwealth's Divorce Code still retains fault
grounds, 43 the addition of no-fault grounds to Pennsylvania's law of

40. Of these 34 jurisdictions, 17 retain some traditional grounds in addition to irretrievable
breakdown. See ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(9) (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110(5)(C) (1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-40 (\Vest Supp. 1980). GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1979); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 580-41 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 32-603 to -610 (1963 & Supp. 1979); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 69 (Supp. 1979-1980);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, §§ 1, 1A, lB (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 93-5-1 to -2 (1972 & Snpp. 1979); N.H. REV. SWAT. ANN. §§ 458:7 -:7-A (1955 & Supp.
1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-04 to -09.1 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.63-.65
(Anderson 1980), R.I. CEN. LAWS § 15-5-3.1 (Stpp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801(11)
(Supp. 1979); TEX. FAn. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.01 (Vernon 1975); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(10)
(Supp. 1979).
In 17 jurisdictions, irretrievable breakdown is the sole ground for divorce (with some of
these jurisdictions retaining insanity as a separate ground). See ARIz. REX. STAT. ANN. § 25-312
(Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970) (see also Summary Dissolution of Marriage Act, CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4550-4555 (West Supp. 1980)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-106
(Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505 (Stpp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West
Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.5 (West Supp. 1979-1980); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 403.110,
-. 140, -. 170 (Stipp. 1978); MICH. Coip. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.06 (West Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.320 (Vernon Supp. 1980); MONT.

REX'. CODES ANN. §§ 40-4-101, -104, -1(17 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-353, 42-361 (1978);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.025, -.036 (1979); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 104 (Supp. 1979); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STATr. ANN. §§ 247.07, -.082, -.09, -. 12 (West
Supp. 1979-1980); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-104 (1977). See Freed & Foster, supra note 3, at 402930.
41. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1979) (three years); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-40 (West Supp. 1980) (eighteen months); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-904 (West
Supp. 1978-1979) (six months voluntary; one year involuntary); HAVAII RE'. STAT. § 580-41
(1976) (two years); IDAHO CODE § 32-610 (1963) (five years); LA. REx,. STAT. ANN. § 9.301
(West Supp. 1980) (one year); MD. ANN. COnE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1979) (one year voluntary;
three years involuntary); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010(9) (1969) (one year); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458:7 (1955) (two years); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:34-2 (West Supp. 1979) (eighteen
months); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Supp. 1979) (one year); OHio REX'. CODE ANN. § 3105.61
(Anderson 1980) (two years); DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(d)(1) (three years); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, § 321(9) (Supp. 1978) (two years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3 (Supp. 1979) (three
years). S.C. CODE § 20-3-10 (Supp. 1979) (one year); TEX. FAN]. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.06
(Vernon 1975) (three years); VT. STAW. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7) (1974) (six months); VA. CODE §
20-91(9) (1975) (on year); VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(7) (Supp. 1979). See also Freed k Foster, supra
note 3, at 4030.
42. See, e.g., Ferrer v. Commonwealth, 4 Faro. "L. Rep. 2744 (P.R. Sup. Ct. May 15, 1978);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. Dos. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1977); OHIO
REX'. COE ANN. §§ 3105.61-.65 (Anderson 1980); TENN. CoIe ANN. § 36-801(11) (Supp. 1979);

DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1,

§§

201(c), (d)(1)(i); W. VA. CODE.

§ 48-2-4(a)(10)

(Supp. 1979).

The new Pennsylvania Code does not go as far as a number of states which allow divorce
on the ground of incompatibility. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(7) (1977); ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.110(5)(C) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-40 (West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 60-1601 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT.

§

125.010(10) (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-4-1

to -2 (1978);

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (West 1961).

43. See DIVORCE CoDE, supra note 1, § 201(d)(2); note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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divorce allows courts to grant or deny divorce on the basis of a determination regarding the continued viability of the marital relationship and the welfare of the family."4 Therefore, the reforms initiated
by the Divorce Code should alleviate much of the hardship which
existed under the prior fault system, Considerations of fault or innocence cannot impede a no-fault divorce since the focus of the no-fault
inquiry is on the existence of a marital breakdown, rather than on the
cause of the breakdown. 4 5 Nevertheless, the inclusion of marital
fault as a factor in the awarding of alimony, unfortunately, returns the
46
element of fault to even a no-fault divorce.
An additional consequence of the Act may be that the availability
of alimony and property distribution 47 will temper the incentives that
fueled contested divorces in the past. Thus, the passage of the Divorce Code should reduce the number of contested divorce cases,
shifting the battleground from the divorce itself to questions of support and property division. 4 8 It will also reduce the impetus for migratory divorce, since the contiguous jurisdictions have similar sup49
port and property division statutes.
B. Division of Property Following Divorce
1.

Prior Law

Principally, American jurisdictions adhere to one of the following
three approaches to post-divorce division of property: common law; 50
52
community property; 51 or equitable distribution of property.
In some of the states which adhere to a community property
scheme, 53 all property acquired during marriage, regardless of who

44. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102.

45. See Note, supra note 22, at 850-51.
46. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(a)( 14).
47. See id. §§ 401, 501.
48. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
49. See notes 150-390 and accompanying text infra.
50. For a discussion of common law property systems, see generally Greene, supra note 4,
at 76-82. For a discussion of how this system operated in Pennsylvania prior to the adoption of
the new Code, see Perlberger, Marital Property Distribution:Legal and Emotional Considerations, Symposium: Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. REV. 662,
666-71 (1980).
51. See, e.g., ARsz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800
(West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (Supp. 1979); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2335 (West Supp.
1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 3.63, 5.01, 5.02 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.080, 26.16.030 (Supp.
1978), For a discussion of the community property approach, see Greene, supra note 4, at
72-76; note 4 supra.
52. See, e.g., DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(d).
53. For a list of the states which follow the community property approach, see note 51
supra.
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has title, is presumed to be owned equally by both parties unless
protected by statute or agreement. 54 In these jurisdictions, each
spouse has a vested one-half interest in the property at the time of
acquisition. 5 5
Prior to the enactment of the Code, Pennsylvania was a common
law jurisdiction. 5 6 In such a jurisdiction, property is distributed
upon marital dissolution, solely on the basis of in whose name title is
held. 5 7 Thus, except for property held jointly or by the entirety, 58
either spouse could acquire property in his or her name during the
period of the marriage and not have that property affected by divorce. 5 9 The only exception to this rule was that instances of fraud
or deceit by either party might cause the courts to impose a constructive trust. 60 Therefore, the old law in Pennsylvania provided virtually no protection for the dependent spouse upon divorce since not
only was that spouse denied post-divorce alimony, 6 1 but he or she
was also without rights in property acquired during the marriage that
62
was titled solely in the name of the other spouse.

54. See Greene, supra note 4, at 87, 102. For an example of statutory classifications which
remove certain types of property from the "'community," see TEX. FAN1. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §

5.01(a) (Vernon 1975).
55. See Greene, supra note 4, at 87, 102.
56. See Morrissey, supra note 4, at 511 & n.45.
57. See A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 38, § 3.4.5(c) (1978); Morrissey, supra

note 4, at 510-11.
58. See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 136, 224 A.2d 164, 172 (1966) (property conveyed
to both spouses created a tenancy by the entirety). Upon divorce, property held by the entirety
becomes a tenancy in common, and both spouses normally receive half on partition. See
Perlberger, supra note 50, at 670.
59. The harsh operation of the common law approach has been described as follows:
[The old Code] it is true, converts entireties property into tenancy in common after an
absolute divorce, but, even so, it puts the parties through a tedious and expensive partition action to achieve it. And if, as often happens, nothing is held by the entireties, or if
such property as is owned has been titled in the sole name of one party, the statute will
find nothing to partition, and the other party . . . comes out with nothing.
Morrissey, supra note 4, at 505.
60. See Greene, supra note 4, at 99.
61. See notes 80-85 and accompanying text infra.
62. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra. Prior to 1978, both spouses had either
common law dower rights or curtesy rights in the property. See Wood, Deeds of Conveyancing
in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, Commentary at 6-7 (Purdon 1955). These rights often
were important negotiating tools in noncontested divorces and property settlements because
neither spouse could convey without release of them during the marriage. Id. Dower and curtesy were deleted from Pennsylvania jurisprudence by an amendment to the probate code in
1978. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2105 (Purdon Supp. 1980).

Even under the old law, there was one form of post-divorce economic protection available,
it was contained in a federal statute. The social security laws provide that a "divorced wife"
may receive payments if she was married to her former husband for at least 10 years prior to
the divorce. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 402(e), 416(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).

but
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2. The New Code
As stated previously, the third possible mode of property distribution is equitable distribution. 63 With the passage of the Divorce
Code, Pennsylvania joins thirty-six other jurisdictions64 and now
adheres to this doctrine. Essentially, equitable distribution, as stated
by the Code, means that the court is empowered to "equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties
without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court
deems just after considering all relevant factors." 65 The Code defines marital property as "all property acquired by either party during
the marriage." 66 There are, however, a number of statutory exceptions to this definition, 6 7 including property conveyed in good faith
68
and for value prior to divorce.
The Code lists a number of nonexclusive factors, similar to the
alimony provisions, which a court should consider in determining

63. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.

64. See ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51 to -55 (Supp. 1979); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210(b) (1978);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (Supp. 1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp. 1978);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-910 (West Supp. 1978-1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (Supp. 1979);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West

Supp. 1979-1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1976); KY. REX'. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1978);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (Supp. 1979-1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-6A-03 to -05 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1980);
MICH. COmP. LAws ANN. § 552.23 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West
Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon 1977); MONT. REX'. CODES ANN. § 40-4-202

(1979); NEB. RE'. STAT. § 42-365 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458:19-:20 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2, -16.5, -16.6 (Stipp.
1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1980);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1979-1980); OR. REX'. STAT. § 107.105(e) (1979);

R.I. GEN. LAWs § 15-5-16.1 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COmP. LAWS ANN, § 25-4-44 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN.

§§

36-820 to -826 (1977 & Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1979);

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.255 (West Supp. 1979-1980);
Wvo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977).
65. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(d).
66. Id. § 401(e). All property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital property
no matter which party holds title. Id. § 401(f). The presumption can be overcome only by a
6
showing that the property fits within an exception listed in § 401(e)(l)-( ). Id. § 401(f).
67. Id. § 401(e)(1)-(6). The exclusions are 1) property acquired in exchange for property
acquired prior to the marriage except for the increase in value during the marriage; 2) property
excluded by valid agreement of the parties; 3) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent except for the increase in value during the marriage; 4) property acquired between
separation and divorce; 5) property which a party has sold, granted, conveyed, or disposed of in
good faith and for value prior to the commencement of divorce proceedings; 6) veterans' bene-

fits which, by federal law, are exempt from attachment, levy, or seizure except those retirement
benefits which the veteran has waived in order to receive veterans' compensation; and 7) property to the extent it has been mortgaged or otherwise encumbered in good faith for value prior
to the divorce proceedings. Id.
68. Id. § 401(e)(5). For a discussion of the practical limitations on a spouse's ability to execute such transactions, see notes 73-76 and accompanying text infra.
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how the property should be divided,-69 excluding marital fault.70
They are 1) the length of the marriage; 2) any prior marriage of either
party; 3) the age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of
the parties; 4) the contribution of either party to the education or
increased earning power of the other party; 5) the opportunity of each
party for future acquisitions of capital and income; 6) the sources of
income of both parties, including medical, retirement, insurance, or
other benefits; 7) the contribution or dissipation allocable to each
party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation of
the marital property, including the contribution of a party as a
homemaker; 8) the value of the property set apart to each party; 9)
the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
and 10) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the
division is to become effective. 7 1
An enforcement provision is also included in the equitable distribution section of the Code. 72 In the event a party attempts to
remove property from the court's jurisdiction or disposes of the property in order to avoid alimony, child support, equitable distribution,
or spousal support, the court can enjoin such action. 73 Additionally,
any grantee or mortgagee of property from one of the parties who had
notice of the pendency of a matrimonial action, or who paid an inadequate consideration for the property, faces the possibility that the
transaction will be deemed null and void. 74 Therefore, although a
party can transfer property during marriage, 75 the Code seems to
mandate that such transfers must be carefully scrutinized for any sign
76
of bad faith.
In general, the adoption of the equitable distribution provisions
reflects a modern, realistic view of the marriage as a partnership. 77
Furthermore, it recognizes the nonmonetary as well as monetary contributions of both spouses to the economic viability of the marriage. 78 Thus, the equitable distribution provisions, in conjunction

69. See DIVoRcE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(d)(l)-(10).
70. Id. § 401(d).
71.

(d.

72. Id. § 403.
73. Id. § 403(a). In addition, the court may issue a writ of ne exeat to preclude removal of

the property. Id. A writ of tie exeat forbids the person against whom it is addressed from
leaving the jurisdiction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 929-30 (5th ed. 1979).
74. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 403(d).

75. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
76. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 403.
77. See Greene, supra note 4, at 99.

78. See id. at 102-04.
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with the alimony provisions, represent a giant step toward economic
justice and financial independence for divorced spouses, the effect of
which can only be to mitigate the emotional trauma associated with
marital breakdown.79
C. Alimony
1. Prior Law
Prior to the enactment of the new Code, the law of alimony in
Pennsylvania was concisely summarized by one court as follows: "The
Pennsylvania Divorce Law does not provide for alimony following any
divorce from the bonds of matrimony, except in cases of insanity." 8 0
While the courts did not order alimony in order to effectuate a noncontested divorce, 8 ' many parties agreed to contractual alimony provisions. However, since the law of Pennsylvania dictated that the
duty to provide spousal maintenance terminated upon divorce, 2 the
only remedies to enforce this agreed-upon alimony were contractual. 8 3 Thus, litigation to enforce consensual alimony provisions, like
most civil litigation, was long and drawn out, resulting in financial
hardship to the obligee-spouse.84 Additionally, the Pennsylvania
courts would not enforce alimony provisions which were part of a
divorce decree rendered by another state; rather, they required that
the dependent spouse reduce the current alimony debt to a judgment
or sue repeatedly on the contract. 8 5 Thus, the law in Pennsylvania
as it pertained to alimony often left dependent spouses in very precarious financial situations.

79. See Kaslow, Stages of Divorce: A Psycholegal Perspective, Symposium: Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. REV. 718, 720-21, 742-47 (1980); Perlberger,
supra note 50, at 662-66.

80. Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 458 Pa. 147, 156-58, 329 A.2d 483, 488-89 (1974). See PA.
SWAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (Purdon 1955) (repealed 1980) (provision in the old law allowing postdivorce alimony to an insane respodent spouse). The only state which presently does not allow
alimony after absolute divorce is Texas. See note 4 supra.
81. For a discussion of the preferability of noncontested divorces under the old law, see
notes 14-21 and accompanying test supra.
82. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Platt v. Platt, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 423, 425, 323 A.2d
29, 31 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Jones v. Jones, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 4, 260 A.2d 809, 811
(1969).
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, 434 Pa. 1, 8, 253 A.2d 263,
267-68 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Jones v. Jones, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 4, 260 A.2d 809, 811
(1969).
84. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Slatowski, 423 Pa. 498, 501-03, 224 A.2d 212, 214-15 (1966) (the
original complaint in Silvestri was filed in December 1964; the case was reversed and remanded
in November 1966).
85. See A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 38, § 6.9.
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2. The New Code
As a result of the passage of the new Code, the days of a dependent spouse being forced either to rely on slow-moving contractual
remedies or to stay in a broken marriage in order to effectuate financial survival are over. The new Divorce Code makes post-divorce
alimony available to either spouse 8 6 and provides several mechanisms
87
to enforce the obligation.
The award of alimony, however, is within the court's discretion
and may be granted only when the court finds that the party seeking
alimony "(1) lacks sufficient property [after equitable distribution] ...
to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment." 88 The
Code enumerates fourteen nonexclusive factors similar to the property division factors which the court shall take into account in determining whether alimony is necessary and what the amount and the
duration of the award should be. 8 9 These factors are 1) the parties'
relative earnings and earning capacities; 2) the ages and health of the
parties; 3) the source of the parties' income, if any (i.e., employment,
insurance, retirement benefits); 4) the parties' expectancies and inheritances; 5) the length of the marriage; 6) any contribution made by
one spouse to the other's education, training, or increased earning
power; 7) the extent to which it would be inappropriate for one
spouse to work or refrain from working because that spouse is the
custodian of minor children; 8) the standard of living established by
the parties during marriage; 9) the relative education and the time
necessary for the party seeking alimony to acquire sufficient education
in order to obtain appropriate employment; 10) the relative assets and
liabilities of the parties; 11) the property either party brought to the
marriage; 12) the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker; 13) the
relative needs of the parties; and 14) marital misconduct during the
marriage prior to the filing of the divorce complaint. 90 The Code
limits the duration of alimony to that period necessary for the party
receiving the award to obtain appropriate employment or to develop

86. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(a). The new Code also continues the allowance of'
alimony pendente lite. Id. § 502.
87. See id. § 503. The court may enter judgment, seize goods, attach wages up to 50%, and
award interest on unpaid installments. Id.
88. ld. § 501(a)(1)-(2).

89. See id. § 501(b).
90. Id. When making or denying an award, the court is obliged to set forth the reasons for
its order. Id. § 501(d).
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an appropriate employable skill, unless that party's ability to do so
has been diminished by age, health, custody of minor children, or
some other compelling impediment. 9 1 It fiurther bars an award of
alimony
to a petitioner cohabitating with a member of the opposite
9 2
sex.

Like other equitable awards, awards of alimony under the Code
are subject to modification upon a showing of changed circumstances. 93 Significantly, however, remarriage of the obligee94
spouse will aUtomatically terminate the award.
In order to alleviate the problems which existed under the prior
law of contractual alimony arrangements enforceable only by timeconsuming contract remedies, 95 the new Code provides that, upon
court approval, such agreements are court orders and are enforceable
as such under the Code. 96 Additionally, the new Code provides that
an alimony award by a sister state may he enforced if the obligor is
97
present in Pennsylvania or has property located in the state.
By providing for alimony, the Divorce Code shifts the emphasis
away fiom bitterly contested suits for divorce. The need for migratory
divorce or "captive marriage" is greatly reduced. The new Code will
not, however, eliminate the contest over marital assets, although it
does provide the framework for the equitable division of these assets.
It is hoped that the Code's enforcement of private agreements will
encourage consensual alimony contracts like those negotiated under
the prior law. Thus, the alimony provisions serve the policies of the
Code by comporting with the economic realities of marriage and by
recognizing the contribution of both parties in the acquisition of the
marital assets.98

91. I. § 501(c).
92. Id. § 507.
93. Id. § 501(e). The statute forbids retroactive modifications of alimonv awards; subsequent
orders of the court affect only those payments which accrue after the filing of a petition for

modification. Id.
94. Id.

95. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
96. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(f). Willfi violation of such a court-approved
agreement could be deemed civil contempt. Id. § 50 3(g).
97. Id. § 506. The statute provides that jurisdiction based on propertv located within the
state is quasi in ren jurisdiction. Id. Of course, such jurisdiction must comport with the notions
of due process elucidated by the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. leitner, 433 U.S.

186, 205-16 (1977).
It should also be noted that the Code negates much of the incentive for migratorv divorces

by providing that an ex parte foreign divorce will not terminate the other spouse's right to
alimonv. See DIoR cOECODF, supra note 1, § 505.
98. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102.
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A. No-Fault Divorce
There is much to be learned from a comparison of the Pennsylvania no-fault law 99 and the divorce laws of neighboring states since a
comparative analysis reveals substantial similarities between them.
1. Delaware
Like Pennsylvania, Delaware presently permits divorce where
the court finds "that the marriage is irretrievably broken and that
reconciliation is improbable." 100 "Irretrievably broken" is statutorily
characterized by "(1) voluntary separation, or (2) separation caused by
respondent's misconduct, or (3) separation caused by respondent's
mental illness, or (4) separation caused by incompatibility." 101 Separation in Delaware is defined as living separate and apart for at least
02
six months.1
The voluntary separation provision in the Delaware Act is
analogous to the Pennsylvania provision which allows divorce upon
mutual consent if there is irretrievable breakdown. 10 3 The voluntary
separation provision has been interpreted as requiring true mutuality
of consent before there can be voluntary separation.' 0 4 For example,
in Wife S. v. Husband S.,' 0 5 the court found that since the separation
resulted from the husband's sexual misconduct, the wife's consent to
the divorce was not voluntary106 and, therefore, the divorce could
10 7
not be granted under the voluntary separation section.
99. For a discussion of the basic no-fault provisions of the Pennsylvania Code, see notes
26-49 and accompanying text supra.
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505(a) (Supp. 1978). In addition, Delaware has abolished
the defenses to fault grounds, except in the situation where separation is caused by marital
misconduct. Id. § 1505(c)-(d).
101. Id. § 1505(b).
102. Id. § 1503(7). The minimum time period does not apply when the separation is due to
marital misconduct. Id.
103. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra. The reader will note that the Pennsylvania Code has no requirement of separation in its mutual consent provision. See DIVORCE
CODE, supra note 1, § 201(c); notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra. Under the Pennsylvania Code, separation need only be alleged when the respondent spouse fails to consent. See
DIvORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(d).
104. See, e.g., Hallman v. Hallman, 59 Del. 145, 145, 215 A.2d 427, 427 (1965) (per curiam);
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 58 Del. 312, 314-15, 209 A.2d 166, 168 (1965); Wife S. v. Husband S., 375
A.2d 451, 452-53 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
105. 375 A.2d 451 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
106. Id. at 452-53. See also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 58 Del. 312, 314-15, 209 A.2d 166, 168 (1965);
Wife V. v. Husband V., 291 A.2d 277, 278 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
107. 375 A.2d at 453.
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In addition, Delaware law also makes contested no-fault divorce
available through a liberal construction of' the statutory requirements
for irretrievable breakdown.108 Such a flexible approach allows realization of an express legislative purpose of the Delaware Act-i.e., to
"permit dissolution of a marriage where the marriage is irretrievably
broken despite the objections of an unwilling spouse." 109
2. New Jersey
New Jersey's divorce laws are also similar to the Pennsylvania
Divorce Code in that New Jersey retains some fault grounds in addition to its no-fault provision.110 The rationale for the development of
a no-fault system in New Jersey was stated as follows: "It is not in the
public interest to require dead marriages to continue for the sake of
statistical neatness or comparison or on a misguided assumption that
thereby family life is strengthened." "I Hence, the legislature established a no-fault ground for divorce in accord with the policy stated
above. 112

The New Jersey provision states that a divorce can be granted
upon the following ground:
Separation, provided that the husband and wife have lived
separate and apart in different habitations for a period of at least 18
or more consecutive months and there is no reasonable prospect of
reconciliation; provided, further that after the 18 month period

there shall be a presumption that there is no reasonable prospect
of reconciliation. 113
This provision does not require that the separation be voluntary;
rather, it only requires that there be no reasonable prospect of' reconciliation.'' 4 Therefore, assuming no prospect of' reconciliation exists,
108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505(a)-(b) (Supp. 1978).
109. Id. § 1502(4).
110. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West Supp. 1979-1980). The fault grounds which remain
are adultery, desertion for 12 or more months, extreme cruelty, voluntary drug addiction or
habitual drunkenness, institutionalization for mental illness for 24 or more consectitive months,
imprisonment for more than 18 months, and deviant nonconsensual sexual conduct. ld.
I
2A:34-2(a)-(c), (e)-(h).
111. Gazzillo v. Gazzillo, 153 N.J. Super. 159, 172, 379 A.2d 288, 295 (1977).
112. See Altbrandt v. Altbrandt, 129 N.J. Super. 235, 237, 322 A.2d 839, 840 (1974).
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2(d) (West Supp. 1979-1980) (emphasis in original).

114. See Morrison v. Morrison, 122 N.J. Super. 277, 282, 300 A.2d 182, 184-85 (1972). In
Morrison, the wife was unable to prove that her husband was actually imprisoned for18 months
and therefore was unable to obtain a divorce on that ground. Id. at 282, 300 A.2d at 185. See
note 110 supra. The court stated that if separation is caused by imprisonment or institutionalization, the divorce action must be brought under those grounds and not the no-fault section. 122

N.J. Super. at 282, 300 A.2d at 185. However, the court concluded that the evidence supported
an inference that a separation for the requisite time would have occurred regardless of the
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the statutory language supports an in ference that a simple separation
for the requisite eighteen months would enable the "deserting"
spouse to obtain a divorce under the no-fault provision despite the
other spouse's objection.115 At least one New Jersey court has recognized that reconciliation cannot be achieved unilaterally 116 and,
hence, that a divorce should be granted because the state's interest is
1 17
in preserving viable marriages-not dead ones.
The unilateral character of this provision parallels the Pennsylvania unilateral provision except that the (fualifying time periods are
diflerent. The Pennsylvania Act requires that the parties live separate
and apart for three years,'" whereas the New Jersey Act requires
only eighteen months.119 One wonders whether this significant time
difierential for unilateral divorce will lead citizens of* Pennsylvania to
seek a migratory divorce in light of New Jersey's one-year residency
requirement. 120
Since both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes require
that the parties live separate and apart for specified times,121 it is
enlightening to see how the New Jersey provision has been interpreted. While the statutory language requires different habitations,
one court has interpreted this language as allowing the parties to live
in separate units in the same apartment house. 122 The Pennsylvania
statute has no requirement of living in separate habitations but
merely requires "cessation of any or all cohabitation." 123 There is,
however, no definition of "cohabitation." Therefore, the stage is set
for litigation over the question whether there can be a cessation of
cohabitation while the parties remain living in the same residence. 124

husband's incarceration. Id. at 283, 300 A.2d at 185. Thus, because there was no reasonable
prospect of reconciliation, the court granted the divorce un der the separation provision despite
the husband's objections. Id. at 283-84, 300 A.2d at 185.
115. The -deserted" spouse could, of course, file for divorce under the fatlt provision of
desertion. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2(b) (West Snpp. 1979-1980). In New Jersey, the question of whether the divorce was granted on faultor no-fault groutds may be relevant in determining the amiount of an alimonv award. See notes 157-77 and accompanying text infra.
116. Morrison v. Morrison, 122 N.J. Super. 277, 283, 300 A.2d 182, 185 (1972).
117. See id.; note 111 and accompanying text supra.
118. See DlvoliC, Com--, supra note 1, § 201(d)(l)(i); note 30 and accompanving text supra.
119. See N.J. SWAT. ANN, § 2A:34-2(d) (West Supp. 1979-1980); note 113 and accompanying
text supra.
120. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-10(1) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
121. See id. § 2A:34-2(d); DvoncE Comoe-, supra note 1, § 201(d)(1).
122. See Ballard v. Ballard, 124 N.J. Super. 462, 464-65, 307 A.2d 637, 638 (1973). But see
De Rieozo v. De Rienzo, 119 N.J. Super. 192, 195, 290 A.2d 742, 744 (1972) (holding that a
husband's living in a separate bedroom to which only he had access was not sufficient separation
to be "living apart").
123. DiVOiCE CODE, supra note 1, § 104.
124. See The New Divorce Reform Late of Pensylvania, 1 PA. FAIi. LAw. 34, 37 (1980).
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3. Ohio
The Ohio statute, revised in 1974, is similar to the Pennsylvania
and New Jersey statutes in that it, too, retains some fault grounds 125
while adding tie following no-fault provision: "The court of common
pleas may grant divorces . . . [o]n the application of either party,
when husband and wife have, without interruption for two years,
lived separate and apart without cohabitation .... ."126
Additionally, the Ohio divorce statute has a provision which al27
lows dissolution of the marriage upon joint petition of the parties.1
If the parties wish to proceed under this section, however, they must
attach to their petition for marital dissolution a separation agreement
bilaterally settling any issues concerning alimony, property distribution, or child custody.' 2 8 The rationale for this provision "is that the
parties themselves can best explore the viability of their own marriage relationship and the possibility of reconciliation." 129
While the Ohio marital dissolution provision is somewhat similar
to the Pennsylvania Code in that it allows divorce on mutual consent,
there are some seemingly significant differences. First of all, the
Pennsylvania statute appears more liberal to the extent that the parties do not have to agree on anything except that the marriage is
irretrievably broken-i.e., a bilateral separation agreement is not required as in Ohio. 130 As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely
that parties to a Pennsylvania divorce will agree that the marriage is
irretrievably broken unless they have agreed to a division of their
assets or have agreed to have the court divide them.
On the other hand, the Pennsylvania statute seems to be more
conservative in that it still requires irretrievable breakdown, 13 1
whereas Ohio only requires consent. 132 One wonders, however, if
this apparent conservativeness in the Pennsylvania statute is merely
illusory. In effect, when one compares the Ohio mutual consent
provision and the Pennsylvania provision with the exception of the
separation agreement they are substantively similar.' 3 3 It seems,

125. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson 1980).

126. Id. §3105.01(K).

127. ld. §§3105.61, .63.
128. Id. § 3105.63. The court decree issued upon mutual marital dissolution has the same
effect as a decree of divorce. Id. § 3105.65(B).
129. Note, supra note 22, at 867.
130. See DI'O CsECODE, supra note 1, § 201(c).
131. See id.
132. See OHIO RE'. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(K) (Anderson 1980).
133. Both statutes require a cooling off period after the filing of the complaint. Compare
DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(c) (90 days) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.64 (Ander-
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therefore, that the Pennsylvania mutual consent provision is really a
divorce upon agreement provision as opposed to a grounds provision.
The mutual consent and two-year separation provisions in the
Ohio statute reflect the legislative awareness "that continuation of
marriages that have ceased to exist in fact is against society's best
interest." 134 Thus, the Ohio legislature went farther than Pennsylvania and abolished recrimination 135 and condonation 136 as defenses
to all forms of divorce. 137

This reform was apparently in recognition

of the use of these defenses to unjustly "punish two hopelessly estranged spouses." 138
As a result of this legislative policy and the abolition of defenses,
the only areas of contest in an action brought under the unilateral
two-year separation provision 139 are whether or not the parties had 1)
lived separate and apart, 2) without cohabitation, 3) for the requisite

two-year period. An Ohio lower court has stated in regard to the
cohabitation requirement that isolated acts of sexual intercourse do
not constitute cohabitation where the parties do not otherwise function as husband and wife.140 However, another Ohio court has in-

terpreted the "separate and apart" requirement as not being satisfied
where the parties lived in different structures on the same premises
with one party continuously visiting the other to do household

chores.141 Thus, the question of whether the statutory requirements

son 1980) (30-90 days). Furthermore, both statutes have counseling provisions applicable to
mutual consent divorce. See id. § 3105.091; DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 202(b).
134. See Note, supra note 22, at 845. As one Ohio court has stated:
[I]mplicit in the statutory scheme is the legislative recognition that it is socially and morally undesirable to compel couples to a dead marriage to retain an illusory and deceptive
status and that the best interests not only of the parties but of society itself, will be
furthered by enabling them to "extricate themselves from a perpetual state of marital
limbo."
Cassaro v. Cassaro, 50 Ohio App. 2(1 368, 370-71, 363 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1976), quoting Gleason
v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 35, 256 N.E.2d 513, 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 351 (1970).
135. Under the doctrine of recrimination, if the conduct of both husband and wife has been
such as to furnish grounds for divorce, neither is permitted to obtain relief. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 114"7 (5th ed. 1979). Moreover, "to bar divorce, complainant's misconduct need
not be of equal degree with that of defendant, but must be of [the] same general character." Id.
136. Condonation is the "conditional remission or forgiveness, by means of continuance or
resumption of marital cohabitation, bv one of the married parties, of a known marital offense
committed by the other, that would constitute a cause of divorce; the condition being that the
offense shall not be repeated." Id. at 268.
137. Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.10(c) (Anderson 1980). The Pennsylvania Code has
abolished these defenses only with respect to no-fault grounds. See DiVORCE CODE, supra note
1, § 207(a).
138. See Note, supra note 22, at 847.
139. For the terms of this provision, see text accompanying note 126 supra.
140. Sindel v. Sindel, 7 Ohio Op. 3d 223, 226 (Ct. App. 1975).
141. See Bennington v. Bennington, 56 Ohio App. 2d 201, 203, 381 N.E.2d 1355, 1356
(1978).
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have been satisfied is a highly sensitive factual inquiry. As of yet, the
Ohio courts have given little guidance as to what will be the ultimate
parameters of the requisite elements.
One thing that is clear in the Ohio law is that, as in the New
Jersey statute, 142 the "separate and apart" provision requires only
unilateral action. 14 3 Other than failure to satisfy the statutory requirements, there are no defenses to an action brought under this
section. 1 44 While there is no language in the Ohio statute comparable to the "no reasonable prospect of reconciliation" language which
appears in the New Jersey statute, 4 5 Ohio's two-year separation requirement is similar to the New Jersey provision in that it functions
as an irrebuttable presumption that the marriage is dead. 146 Thus, if
one partner to the marriage chooses to withdraw from the marital
residence for the requisite period of time, the statute requires neither
the consent of the other party nor a finding by the court of no prospect of reconciliation. As one commentator has stated: "This rule
effectuates the underlying policy of no-fault divorce to terminate
marriages that have failed in fact. Where one party, although acting
unilaterally, wishes to discontinue the marriage, it is logical to conclude that the marital unit has no chance of survival." 147
While the effects of the Pennsylvania Code seem to be essentially the same, 148 it must be noted that under Pennsylvania's unilateral provision, a party can contest the action and the court, if it finds
a reasonable chance of reconciliation, can require the parties to try to
reconcile for a period of time before it grants the divorce on a unilateral basis.' 4 9 It is hoped that the Pennsylvania courts, like those of
the surrounding jurisdictions, will recognize the underlying policy of
the Code and conclude that, when there has been a three-year separation and one party desires to discontinue the marriage, the marriage is irretrievably broken.

142.
143.
144.
145.

See
See
See
See

notes 113-24 and accompanying text supra.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(K) (Anderson 1980).
Cassaro v. Cassaro, 50 Ohio App. 2d 368, 370-71, 363 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1976).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2(d) (West Supp. 1979-1980); text accompanying note 113

supra.
146. See Note, supra note 22, at 854 & n.54. The sponsor of Ohio's two-year separation

statute, Representative Alan E. Norris, has stated that "[t]he practical effect of this provision is
to define a marriage which is beyond saving; where one spouse has absented himself for two
years, the possibility of reconciliation is remote indeed." Norris, Divorce Reform: Ohio's Alternative to No-Fault, 48 STATE GOV'T 52, 54 (1975), quoted in Note, supra, at 854 n.54.
147. Note, supra note 22, at 864 (footnote omitted).
148. See DI'ORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102.
149. Id. § 201(d)(2).
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B. Alimony
1. New Jersey
The New Jersey statute provides for alimony to be awarded, as
the court deems reasonable and just, to either party based upon actual need, ability of the parties to pay, and the duration of the marriage. 150 When the divorce is granted on fault grounds, the court
may consider the proofs made in the divorce action for the 1urpose of
151
ascertaining the amount of the alimony award.
Over the years, the Superior Court of New Jersey has noted that
the rationale for the granting of alimony is as follows: 1) to permit a
wife to share in the accumulation of the marital assets; 152 2) to prevent her from becoming a public charge; 153 and 3) "to permit a wife
to share in the economic rewards occasioned by her husband's income
level (as opposed merely to the assets accumulated), reached as a
result of their combined labors, inside and outside the home." 14
Our discussion will focus on two aspects of alimony in New Jersey:
156
the role of marital fault 15 and the amount of the award.
a. Marital Fault
Only where a divorce has been granted on the basis of marital
fault does the New Jersey statute allow the court in its discretion to
consider evidence of fault in determining the size of the alimony
award. 15 7 By contrast, the Pennsylvania Divorce Code allows marital
misconduct during the marriage to be reflected in the alimony de58
termination, without regard to the grounds for divorce.1
New Jersey's experience with the use of marital fault, especially
adultery, as a consideration in the alimony determination is enlightening. Initially, the New Jersey courts took a hard line toward an adul-

150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1979-1980).

151. Id.
152. Lynn v. Lynn, 153 N.J. Super. 377, 382, 379 A.2d 1046, 1048 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 398 A.2d 141 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
153. Lynn v. Lynn, 153 N.J. Super. 377, 382, 379 A.2d 1046, 1048 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 398 A.2d 141 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
154. Gugliotta v. Gugliotta, 160 N.J. Super. 160, 164, 388 A.2d 1338, 1340 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978), aff'd per Curiamn, 164 N.J. Super. 139, 395 A.2d 901 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
155. See notes 157-77 and accompanying text infra.
156. See notes 178-227 and accompanying text infra.
157. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1979-1980). The section provides in pertinent part: "In all actions for divorce other than those where judgment is granted solely on the
ground of separation, the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground
in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just." Id.
158. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 510(b)(14). This section specifically excludes consideration of conduct during any separation subsequent to the filing of a divorce petition. Id.
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terous spouse who sought alimony. In Mahne v. Mahne,159 the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court refised to award
alimony to an adulterous wife,160 spawning an inference that adultery
was an automatic bar to alimony.161 The Appellate Division, however, clarified the Mahne decision in Nocherson v. Nocherson,162 explaining that fault, and in particular adultery, is merely one factor in
the decision to award alimony.163 Mahne was distinguished on the
ground that on the facts of that case, where the wife committed adultery with her husband's best fiiend,164 the equities precluded an
award of alimony.165

The New Jersey courts' original hard line attitude may have resulted from the fact that adultery was previously a crime in that
state.166 For example, in Lynn v. Lynn,167 the lower court had denied alimony to an adulterous wife, even though the adultery had
occurred months after her husband had deserted her,168 on the
theory that the wife should not be permitted to profit from the commission of a crime.169 During the pendency of the Lynn appeal,
Nocherson was decided and the legislature struck the crime of adultery from the books.170 Without relying on the legislative action, the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court reversed the lower court's
decision in Lynn, holding that adultery does not raise a per se bar to
alimony, "especially where the adultery is post-separation or postdesertion and the extra-marital sexual activity did not precipitate the
breakup of the union." 171
Thus, it is now clear that marital fault is just one of many factors
to be used in determining alimony. An example of the postNocherson approach is Gugliotta v. Gugliotta. 172 In Gugliotta, the
court awarded alimony to a wife of twenty-three years despite the fhct
that she had committed adultery with her former employer. 173 Al159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

147 N.J. Super 326, 371 A.2d 314 (1977).
Id. at 329, 371 A.2d at 315.
See Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 336, 398 A.2d 141, 144-45 (1979).
148 N.J. Super. 448, 372 A.2d 1139 (1977).
Id.at 449-50, 372 A.2d at 1140.

164. See 147 N.J. Super. at 328, 371 A.2d at 315.
165. See Nocherson v. Nocherson, 148 N.J. Super. at 450, 372 A.2d at 1140.

166. See N.J.
167. 153 N.J.
165 N.J. Super.
168. 153 N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 2A:88-1 (West 1952) (repealed 1979).
Super. 377, 379 A.2d 1046 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
328, 398 A.2d 141 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
Super. at 380, 379 A.2d at 1047 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.).

169. Id. at 383, 379 A.2d at 1048 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.).

170. See Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. at 335, 398 A.2d at 144 (Super. Ct. App. Div.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:98-2 (West 1980).
171. 165 N.J. Super. at 335, 398 A.2d at 144 (Super. Ct: App. Div.).

172. 160 N.J. Super. 160, 388 A.2d 1338 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 164
N.J. Super. 139, 395 A.2d 901 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).

173. 160 N.J. Super. at 165-66, 388 A.2d at 1341.
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though the husband knew of the aftalir and made at least three attempts at reconciliation, the court believed that the equities of the
situation required an award of alimony. 174 'The court explained its
decision as follows:
The capital assets accumulated during this marriage and divided
under the principle of equitable division may have been relatively
small, but the parties' standard of living was also as much a part of
her efforts as his, and alimony is the vehicle by which the wife is
175
permitted to share in this standard of living after the divorce.
The conclusion to which cases such as Mahne, Lynn, and Gugliotta lead is that a court deciding alimony questions in a fault divorce
should consider the petitioner's fault, if at all, in the context of the
entire marital relationship. Fault should operate as a bar only when
the misconduct is outrageous 176 or has directly contributed to the
177
breakdown of the marriage.
b. Ascertaining the Amount of the Award
Where the alimony sought is in a no-fault divorce action, the
New Jersey statute provides that a court can grant alimony without
regard to fault, 1 78 and, in computing the amount, a court "shall consider the actual need and ability to pay of the parties and the duration of the marriage." 179 Judicial interpretations of this provision are
especially illustrative of the types of issues which may face the
Pennsylvania courts.
One such case is Khalaf v. Khalaf 180 which involved parties who
had been married for twenty-six years before divorcing. 18' The parties had two children, one a college student and one who chose to
live with her father.18 2 The husband was a dentist who had his office
in part of the eleven room marital residence. 183 The parties lived a
comfortable lifestyle, owning two cars., a summer home, and a membership in a local country club. 184 Mrs. Khalaf had no independent
source of income and was dependent on her husband for support.1 85
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
money

Id.
Id. at 164, 388 A.2d at 1341.
See Mahne v. Mahne, 147 N.J. Super. at 328, 371 A.2d at 315.
See Gugliotta v. Gugliotta, 160 N.J. Super. at 165-66, 388 A.2d at 1341.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
id.
58 N.J. 63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971).
Id. at 66, 275 A.2d at 134.
Id. at 67, 275 A.2d at 134.
Id. at 66, 275 A.2d at 134.
Id.
Id. As a hobby, the wife had operated a yarn shop for several years but the venture lost
until she finally gave it up. id. at 66-67, 275 A.2d at 134.
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In determining the amount of the award which the wife should
receive, the court set forth the following test:

The amount is not fixed solely with regard, on the one hand,
to the actual needs of the wife, nor, on the other, to the husband's
actual means. There should be taken into account the physical
condition and social position of the parties, the husband's property
and income, .

.

. and -also the separate property and income of the

wife. Considering all these, and any other factors bearing upon the
question, the sum is to be fixed at what the wife would have the
right to expect as support, if living with her husband.186
The court ascertained that $29,500 was the net amount upon which
support could be calculated, and that $1.50 a week was the amount
needed by the wife for support. 187 The court then proceeded to
award her the full $150 a week, emphasizing that after being married
for twenty-six years without being gainfully employed, the wife
should not be expected to work. 1 88 Indeed, the court stated that the
wife "is entitled to carry on as if still married ... as long as her
husband's means are reasonably able to meet these needs."189 The
court did indicate, however, that the same result might not obtain in
the event that the parties before the court were married for only a
short time and the spouse seeking alimony had not sacrificed any vocational potential for the care of her family.190
Many of the factors considered by the court in Khalaf are also
present in the Pennsylvania statute, e.g., the length of the marriage,
the parties' standard of living, and the wife's contribution as
homemaker.191 Thus, for purposes of comparative analysis,' Khalaf
illustrates the equitable nature of an alimony award and judicial rejection of rigid adherence to mathematical formulae.
A further example of this approach is found in Cqpodanno v.
Capodanno,192 where the court considered the amount of alimony to
be awarded where the parties had been married for thirty-three
186. Id. at 66-67, 275 A.2d at 134, quoting Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 274, 72 A.2d
318, 321 (1950) (other citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
187. 58 N.J. at 69, 275 A.2d at 135.
188. 1d.
189. Id. at 69-70, 275 A.2d at 135.
190. Id. at 70, 275 A.2d at 136. The court observed:
The position of a woman who has given the greater part of her adult life to the care of
husband and home, and has remained vocationally dormant, is far different from that of a
healthy young woman without children, who in a brief period of married life has remained all but alien to her husband's interests. The law should heed their contrasting
requirements.
Id., quoting Hofstadter & Levittan, Alimony-A Reformation, 7.J. FANl. LAW 51, 55 (1967).
191. See Div'oRcE ConE, supra note 1, § 501(b). For a discussion of the relevant factors in
the Pennsylvania Code, see notes 86-92 and accompanying text supra.

192. 58 N.J. 113, 275 A.2d 441 (1971).
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years.193 Unlike Khalaf, however, the wife in Capodanno was gainfilly employed.194 At the time of the hearing, the wife was fifty-six
years old and had been teaching for fifteen years.195 Her income was
$8,864 per year, while her husband earned $35,000 annually. 196 The
court found that, despite the fact that she was earning money, the
wife was entitled to an award of $400 per month. 19 7 The criteria
which the court seemed to be applying included consideration of the
lifestyle that the parties had enjoyed prior to separation, the duration
of the marriage, the ages of the parties, and the husband's ability to
pay-as well as the wife's earnings.198 The award also allowed the
wife to retain savings for "an uncertain futnre." 199
The New Jersey Superior Court considered the question of how
much alimony a well-to-do husband could receive in D'Arc v.
D'Arc.200 In this case, the husband, a psychiatrist who earned
$50,000 per year, asked for support from his wife, an heiress whose
income was in excess of $1,000,000 per year. 20 1 Although their divorce was grounded on an eighteen-month separation, the parties had
stipulated that each retained the right to offer marital fault as evidence in the alimony determination. 20 2 While the court found the
husband guilty of misconduct,2 0 3 it concluded unequivocally that even
without regard to fault he was not entitled to alimony. 20 4 The court
declared that "not only is Dr. D'Arc not in 'need' of support, but the
record clearly shows that he is able to provide a comfortable living for
himself." 205
In Lavene v. Lavene, 20 6 the New Jersey Superior Court gave
another example of its flexible approach to alimony. The duration of
the marriage in Lavene had been much shorter than in the cases previously discussed. 20 7 Upon divorce, the wife had received $16,050
by virtue of a property distribution, an amount equal to approxi-

193. Id. at 117, 275 A.2d at 443.
194. Id.

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 120, 275 A.2d at 445.
Id. at 119, 275 A.2d at 444.

199. Id. at 120, 275 A.2d at 445.

200. 164 N.J. Super. 226, 395 A.2d 1270 (1978).
201. Id. at 230-32, 395 A.2d at 1273-74.
202. Id. at 231, 395 A.2d at 1273.
203. Id. at 237, 395 A.2d at 1276. There was evidence that the husband had attempted to
have his wife murdered. Id. at 234, 395 A.2d at 1274.
204. Id. at 237-38, 395 A.2d at 1276.
205. Id.

206. 162 N.J. Super. 187, 392 A.2d 621 (1978).
207. See id. at 203, 392 A.2d at 629; notes 180-205 and accompanying text supra.
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mately one-half of her husband's interest in a closely held corporation. 20
Although there were no barriers to her becoming gainfully
employed, 20 9 the court ruled that $400 per month was a reasonable
2 10
award.
Similar in its flexible approach is the superior court's decision in
Stout v. Stout.211 In Stout, the parties had been married for seventeen years and had supported four children including one who was
disabled. 212 The wife had custody of the children. 213 The husband
was a teacher and had additional income from service in the Army
Reserves. 214 The lower court awarded the wife $165 a week, $50 of
which was alimony. 215 On appeal, the husband argued that this sum,
which represented 55% of his income, was excessive. 2 16 The court,
however, affirmed the award, holding that alimony and support
awards "should not be made to depend solely upon a percentage of
net earnings which is left to the husband."217 In its determination
that the award was correct, the court was swayed by the fact that the
husband could supplement his income through summer employnent. 218

The concept of rehabilitative alimony 2 19 has also been addressed
in New Jersey. In Turner v. Turner,2 20 the parties had been married
for twenty-two years and had three children, only one of whom had
reached the age of majority. 22 1 The wife was attending college and
anticipated that she would graduate approximately one year from the
date of the award. 222 Her potential earnings were $12,000 per year,
whereas her husband, a disabled veteran, had an income of $31,000
plus a $5,000 military pension. 2 23 After equitable distribution of

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

162 N.J. Super. at 202, 392 A.2d at 629.
Id. at 203, 392 A.2d at 629.
Id.
155 N.J. Super. 196, 382 A.2d 659 (1977).
Id. at201, 382 A.2d at 661..

213. Id.

214. Id.
215. Id. at 202, 382 A.2d at 661.
216. Id. at 206, 382 A.2d at 664.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See DIvoRcE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(c). The concept of rehabilitative alimony is
incorporated into the new Pennsylvania Code which limits alimony to the period necessary for
the beneficiary spouse to 1)obtain employment, or 2)develop an appropriate employable skill.
Id. The statute exempts from this limitation anyone whose ability to secure employment is
"'substantially diminished." Id. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
220. 158 N.J. Super. 313, 385 A.2d 1280 (1978).
221. Id. at 323, 385 A.2d at 1285.
222. Id. at 324, 385 A.2d at 1285.
223. Id.
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property, the wife would receive $80,000.224

On these facts, the

court awarded alimony of $50 per week limited to a period of time to
end after the wife had been employed for one year. 225
The New Jersey alimony cases are helpfil because they illustrate
a pragmatic and highly flexible approach. As these cases indicate,
awards are not based mechanically on need, ability to pay, or the

length of the marriage; rather, other factors such as amount of property owned, standard of living, employment potential, and
homemaker contributions are also relevant considerations. 22 6 The
length of the marriage often appeared to be a predominant factor.
This apparently was so not only due to the statutory requirements but
also )ecause of the court's recognition of the severe difficulties which
confront a beneficiary spouse who attempts to attain occupational independence and continue a prosperous lifestyle after years of financial
227
dependence.
2. Ohio
The Ohio statute provides for the award of' alimony to either
partx', as the court deems reasonable. 2 28 The statute also provides
the following list of factors to guide the court in determining the
alimony award:
(1) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

(2) The ages, and the physical and emotional conditions of the
parties;
(3) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties;
(5) The duration of the marriage;
(6) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party,
because he will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to
seek employment outside the home;
(7) The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(8) The relative extent of" education of the parties;
(9) The relative assets and liabilities of' the parties;
(10) The property brought to the marriage by either party;
229
(11) The contribution of' a spouse as homemaker.

224. Id.
225. Id. at 324, 385 A.2d at 1285-86.
226. See notes 178-225 and accompanying text supra.
227. See Gugiotta v. Gugiotta, 164 N.J. Super. 139, 395 A.2d 901 (1978); notes 180-99 and
accompanying text supra.
228. Omio REX'. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(A) (Anderson 1980).
229. Id. § 3105.18(B)(1)-(11).
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These factors are clearly similar to those in the new Pennsylvania
Code 230 and therefore are extremely pertinent to our discussion. As
was done with the New Jersey statute, we will focus primarily on how
the Ohio courts view marital fault in the determinationof the
award 2 31 and how the courts weigh various other factors in assessing
the award.232
a. Marital fault
Since the statutory list of factors is not exhaustive, 233 marital
fault, which is not included in the list, may still be considered by the
courts in the award of alimony. Its omission is significant, however,
and is evidence of Ohio's "recent movement away from both strict
guidelines and fault orientation in divorce law and towards investing
the courts with much discretion." 234 This movement, however, is
not inconsistent with a consideration of fault in some contexts.
In Wolfe v. Wolfe, 23 5 for example, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated that post-divorce unchastity can be a factor in modifying an
alimony award. 236 The court maintained that although unchastity per
se does not require a termination of alimony, 237 the unchaste conduct
could justify an inquiry into whether the illicit relationship "produced
a change of circumstances sufficient to entitle the former husband to
relief." 238 The Wolfe court applied the statutory guidelines 2 39 in
two ways: first, to determine if alimony was needed; and second, if
needed, to determine the amount.2 4 0 However, by emphasizing
Mrs. Wolfe's "unchastity," rather than her de facto marriage, the
court may have shifted the analysis from the needs of a former spouse

230. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(b)(1)-(14); notes 89-90 and accompanying text
supra.

231. See notes 233-43 and accompanying text infra.
232. See notes 244-55 and accompanying text infra.
233. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B) (Anderson 1980).
234. Note, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 783, 793 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
235. 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
236. Id. at 420, 350 N.E.2d at 426. In Wolfe, a former husband sought relief from alimony
payments on the ground that his former wife was living with her paramour and using her
alimony for their mutual benefit. Id. at 400, 350 N.E.2d at 415. The trial court terminated the
award, reasoning that the former wife's attempt to enjoy the benefits of marriage with her
paramour without losing her alimony placed an inequitable burden on her former husband. Id.
at 401, 350 N.E.2d at 416. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the trial judge
had not abused his discretion in terminating the award. Id. at 421-22, 350 N.E.2d at 427.

237. Id. at 420, 350 N.E.2d at 426.
238. Id. at 421, 350 N.E.2d at 427, quoting Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, 64,
347 A.2d 799, 803 (1975).
239. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1980).

240. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 420-21, 350 N.E.2d at 426-27.
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to the equities of having one former spouse support the other under
24 1
"immoral" conditions.
The drafters of the Pennsylvania Code attempted to deal with
the situation where a former spouse has been living with a paramour
at the time of the request for alimony. 24 2 The Code provides that
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, not a blood relative,
is an automatic bar to an alimony award.243
b. Ascertaining the Amount of the Award
In determining the amount of a judicial alimony award, Ohio requires not only that the amount be within the obligor's ability to pay,
"but it must also leave that individual the means to maintain his own
health and well being by obtaining prope" food, shelter and clothing,
and it must not burden him to the extent his incentive to pay is
destroyed." 2 44 Even under this standard, however, the court may
base an alimony award on earning capacity as well as on actual earnings. 24 5 The cases decided thus far under the statute evaluate the
needs of the obligee-spouse and the equities of the award in the context of any property settlement agreement or division previously
made. 24 6 Indeed, one court has maintained that "[o]nly after a division of property is made, is the court statutorily authorized to consider whether an additional amount is needed for sustenance, and for
what period will such necessity persist."247 This interpretation is
similar to the approach taken by the Pennsylvania Code which declares that alimony will be awarded only to a dependent spouse who
lacks sufficient property to provide for his own needs or who is not
24 8
self-supporting.
Like Pennsylvania, 249 Ohio provides for court adoption of voluntary alimony agreements. 250 Under the Ohio law, where the amount
of alimony is the result of an agreement between the parties, it will
only be adopted by the court if it is found to be equitable to both

241. Note, supra note 234, at 794.
242. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 507.

243. Id. It is not clear, however, if subsequent cohabitation will terminate an existing award,
especially if the need continues. It is also not clear from the language of the Code whether an
incestuous or homosexual relationship will bar an award or terminate an existing award.
244. Swanson v. Swanson, 2 Ohio Op. 3d 65, 71 (1976).
245. Rossman v. Rossman, 47 Ohio App. 2d 103, 108, 352 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1975).
246. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976); Popovic v.
Popovic, 45 Ohio App. 2d 57, 341 N.E.2d 341 (1975).
247.
248.
249.
250.

Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 414, 350 N.E.2d 413, 423 (1976) (footnote omlitted).
See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(a).
See id. § 501(0; notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.05 (Anderson 1980).
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parties, 2 51 and once such an agreement is adopted by the court, it
may only be modified if the court specifically reserved continuing
jurisdiction to do so. 2 52 The Pennsylvania provision on court adoption of voluntary alimony agreements does not specifically state that
the court may refuse to adopt an agreement which it fincs is inequitable to one of the parties, but the power to so reject an agreement is
253
certainly implicit in the express power to approve the agreement.
In contrast to the Ohio provision, the Pennsylvania Code does not
appear to require express retention of' jurisdiction by the court as a
prerequisite to modification of an approved voluntary alimony agreement since the Code provides that an approved agreement becomes
an "order of the court"254 and that all alimony orders are subject to
modification by further court orders upon a showing of' changed circumstances. 255
3. Delaware
Delaware's policy in regard to the award of alimony is like
Pennsylvania's 256 and is succinctly stated in the alimony provision of'
the Delaware Code. 2 57 The state's policy is to award alimony in essentiallv two situations: 1) where one spouse is dependent on the
other for support, the alimony to last fbr the period of' continuing
dependency; 258 and 2) where alimony wouldl help the respondent
spouse become self-supporting. 259 Consistent with this policy, either
petitioner or respondent may receive alimony if he or she can prove
that he or she

251. Popovic v. Popovic, 45 Ohio App. 2d 57, 63-64, 341 N.E.2d 341, 346 (1975). A husband
or wife may contract as if unmarried, but contracts between them are subject to "the general
rules which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other."
Omo RE.. CODE ANN. § 3103.05 (Anderson 1980).
252. Popovie v. Popovie, 45 Ohio App. 2d 57, 64, 341 N.E.2d 341, 346 (1975). This rule is
based on a public policy favoring the finality of judgments. I, Where no agreemenit is involved,
a reservation on continuing jurisdiction will be implied ifthe court awards permanent alimony
for an unspecified or indefinite total amount or if the court sets no termination (late for an
alimony award. 1d. at 64-66, 341 N.E.2d at 347-48.
253. See DivoiicE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(f).

254.
255.

Id.
Id. § 501(e).

256, See notes 86-87 and accompanying text supra.
257. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512 (Michie Interim Supp. 1979).
258. Id. §§ 1502(5) & 1512(a) (Michie Interim Supp. 1979). It should be noted, however, that
even where one spouse is dependent on the other, alimony can be awarded for a maxi1to111
of
onv two y'ears unless 1) the parties had been married for at least 20 \,ears, or 2) the divrce was
grounded upon the mental illness of one of the parties. Id. § 1512(a)(2)-(3).
259. Id. § 1512(b)(2)-(3). The statute also provides a third situation whereby alimony can be
awarded in the event a part' is the custodial parent. Id. § 1512(b)(3). See text accompanying
note 260 infra.
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(1) [i]s dependent upon the other party for support and the

other party is not contractually or otherwise obligated to provide
that support after the entry of a decree of divorce or annulment;
(2) [l]acks sufficient property including any award of marital
property, to provide for the party's reasonable needs; and
(3) [i]s unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be re260
quired to seek employment outside the home.
The statute then proceeds to list seven factors which are relevant
in the alimony determination. They are 1) the financial resources of
the party seeking alimony including his or her share of the marital
property, as well as the ability to meet his or her needs independently; 261 2) the time necessary to develop an employable skill and
become employed; 3) the parties' standard of living; 4) the duration of
the marriage; 5) the age and physical and emotional condition of' the
party seeking alimony; 6) the ability of the obligor-spouse to meet his
or her needs while meeting those of the obligee; and 7) tax conse26 2
quences.
Significantly, the Delaware statute expressly disallows any consideration of marital fault in the alimony determination.26 3 Therefore, our discussion will focus only on the award criteria which are
similar to those used in Pennsylvania.
a. Ascertaining the Amount of the Award
As previously indicated through our analysis of the Ohio and
26 5
New Jersey statutes, 26 4 and as required by the Delaware statute,
the amount of alimony is generally determined on a case-by-case basis
and, thus, few generalizations can be gleaned. One recent case, 26 6
however, is especially illustrative of Delaware's flexible, nondogmatic
approach to alimony and of its view that a divorced dependent spouse
260.

Id.

§ 1512(b) (Michie Interim Supp. 1979).

261. Id. § 1512(c)(1). This factor also includes all sums in a child support order which are
earmarked for the custodial parent. Id.

262. Id. § 1512(c)(2)-(7).

263. Id. § 1512(c). While it has been previously noted that there is no mention of marital
fault in the Ohio statute, it was also pointed out that marital fault can be considered because the
statutory factors are not deemed exclusive. See notes 233-41 and accompanying text supra. By
constrast, although the list of factors in the Delaware statute is also nonexclusive, it specifically
forbids the use of marital fault as a consideration in the alimony determination. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c) (Michie Interim Supp. 1979).
264. See notes 150-252 and accompanying text supra.
265. See notes 257-63 and accompanying text supra.
266. Husband B. v. Wife B., 396 A.2d 169 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978). For a discussion of this
case, see notes 268-75 and accompanying text infra.
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is entitled to retain, upon marital dissolution, a standard of living
similar to that which the spouse enjoyed during the marriage.2 67 In
Husband B. v. Wife B., 2 6 8 the husband was an attorney who earned
$37,000 a year. 2 69 The wife had reentered the job market in 1970
after raising three children; however, she had never earned more
than $7,000 a year. 270 At the time of the divorce in 1978, she was
enrolled in an interior design school and expected to graduate in
three years. 27 1 Although the wife had an income, the court nonetheless awarded her $850 per month for the three years that she would
be in school. 2 72 In making the award, the court recognized that the
policy of the Delaware statute is to award alimony in such a manner
as to completely sever the economic relations of the parties when
circumstances permit.2 73 Yet, the court also pointed out that this
policy must be balanced against the policy which allows the obligeespouse to maintain, as much as possible, the predivorce standard of
living.2 74 Since there was an insufficient amount of marital property
on divorce to permit the wife to support herself independently, the
275
court concluded that the alimony award was necessary.
The only factor which the Delaware statute includes which is not
present in the Pennsylvania Code is that of tax consequences. 2 76 The
Pennsylvania practitioner should note this consideration since the
statutory factors in the Pennsylvania Code are not exclusive 277 and,
therefore, tax considerations may be relevent in appropriate cases.
4. Summary of the Alimony Laws in Neighboring States
The laws of three of the states contiguous with PennsylvaniaNew Jersey, Ohio, and Delaware-all provide alimony for dependent
spouses. As indicated, all of these states apply a flexible and pragmatic approach to determining the amount.2 78 In these states, however, the existence of marital fault or misconduct plays different roles.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(3) (Michie Interim Supp. 1979).
396 A.2d 169 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978).
Id. at 170.
Id.

271. id.

272. id. at 172.
273. Id. See notes 257-60 and accompanying text supra.
274. 396 A.2d at 170.
275. Id. The court refused to include the husband's future pension benefits in the marital
property calculation, maintaining that such awards are inherently uncertain and that to base a

determination on such beneits would continue the economic reiationship longer than the statute intended. Id. at 172.
276. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(7) (Michie Interim Supp. 1979).
277. DIVORCE COoE, supra note 1, § 501(b).
278. See notes 178-227, 244-52 & 264-76 and accompanying text supra.
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In Ohio, marital fault is not an express statutory factor but has been
considered in an alimony modification situation. 2 79 In New Jersey,
marital fillt is a statutory cotsideration, Vet its application is discretionary and has been considered only where the misconduct was
so outrageous as to directly affect the marital relationship. 28 0 The
State of Delaware completely disallows consideration of marital fault
28 1
as a factor in determining alimony.

The new Pennsylvania Code lists marital misconduct as a fac-

tor,28 2 yet it is hoped that the courts will apply this concept only to

extreme cases, employing a restrained approach similar to that of
either Ohio283 or New Jersey. 28 4

Such an approach recognizes that

the notion of alimony is not punitive but rather is a form of distribution of marital property to which both the husband and wife have
contributed and in which both should share.2 8 5 It should also be
recognized that fhult is difficult to translate into a dollar amount and
that its inclusion as a factor in awarding alimony undermines the concept of' no-fault divorce. The notion of using marital fault as a major
factor in determining alimony seems contrary to public policy for it
286
may turn a fault-ridden dependent spouse into a public charge.
Clearly such a result is inconsistent with the policy of the Pennsylvania Code which is, inter alia, to promote "economic justice between [the] parties"287 and to ensure the welfiare of the family, as

opposed to vindicating private rights or punishing marital wrongs. 288
C. Equitable Distribution
New Jersey, Delaware, and Ohio all provide for equitable distribution

289

of property. Therefore, an analysis of the manner in

279. See notes 233-41 and accompanying text suipra.
280. See notes 157-77 and accompanying text supra.
281. See note 263 arid accompanying text supra.
282. See DIvoVORC: CoDE, supra note 1, § 501(b)(14).
283. See notes 233-41 and accompanying text supra.
284. See notes 157-77 and accorpanying text sup)ra.
285. See Ggi otta v. Grgliotta, 160 N.J. Super. 160, 164-65, 388 A.2d 1338, 1340-41 (Super
Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), affd per curiam, 164 N.J. Super. 139, 395 A.2d 901 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978). See also DIVORcE CODE, srpra 1rite 1, § 102(6) (stating that one purpose of the Divorce
Code is to ensure economic justice).
286. See Gugliotta v. Gugliotta, 160 N.J. Super. 160, 164, 388 A.2d 1338, 1340 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 164 N.J. Super. 139, 395 A.2d 901 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978).
287. DIVORCE ComnE, suipra note 1, § 102(6).
288. Id. § 102(3). The Unifim Marriage and Divorce Act, which is similar to all the statutes
considered in this article, states that a court should rot consider misconduct but rather should
focus on the parties needs and contributions. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AN) DiVoRcE ACT §
308(h), Commissioner's Comment, reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 160 (1979).
289. For a discussion of the different types of marital property systems, see notes 50-79 and
accompanying text supra.
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which the system operates in those states may give one a better idea
of how equitable distribution will develop under the new Pennsyl290
vania Divorce Code.
1. New Jersey
a. The Statute
The New Jersey Divorce Code provides that, pursuant to a
judgment of divorce, the courts may equitably divide both real and
personal property. 2 9 1 Unlike the Pennsylvania Code, 292 the New
Jersev statute does not include a list of factors to guide a court in its
determination. 2 93 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Painter v.
Painter,294 however, approved a list of "illustrative but not exhaustive" criteria. 295 The factors are
(1) respective age, background and earning ability of the parties; (2)
duration of the marriage; (3) the standard of living of the parties
during the marriage; (4) what money or property each brought into
the marriage; (5) the present income of the parties; (6) the property
acquired during the marriage by either or both parties; (7) the
source of acquisition; (8) the current value and income producing
.capacity of the property; (9) the debts and liabilities of the parties
to the marriage; (10) the present mental and physical health of the
parties; (11) the probability of continuing present employment at
present earnings or better in the future; (12) effect of distribution
of assets on the ability to pay alimony and support, and (13) gifts
2 96
from one spouse to the other during marriage.

The Painter court also cited with approval the equitable distribution
approach taken by the drafters of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce

290. For a discussion of the pertinent equitable distribution provisions of the new Code, see
notes 63-79 and accompanying text supra.

291. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1979-1980). The statute provides that "the
court may make such award or awards to the parties . . . to effectuate an equitable distribution
of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or
either of them during the marriage." Id. Thus, title is no longer relevant.
292. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
293. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1979-1980). The constitutionality of the
New Jersey provision has been upheld. See Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 225, 320 A.2d
496, 499 (1974).
294. 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
295. Id. at 212, 320 A.2d at 492.
296. Id. at 211, 320 A.2d at 492, quoting Painter v. Painter, 118 N.J. Super. 322, 335, 287
A.2d 467, 469 (1972).
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Act 297 which considers similar factors and simply allows each party to
298
keep what is his or her own.
Due to the lack of legislative criteria throughout the equitable
distribution provision, the court had to develop a definition of the
marital property subject to distribution. Therefore, in Painter, the
court ruled that "all property, regardless of its source, in which a
spouse acquires an interest during the marriage shall be eligible for
distribution in the event of divorce." 29 9 In defining what timespan is
intended by the phrase "during the marriage," the court stated that
the period commences as soon as the marriage ceremony has taken
place and terminates the day the complaint is filed. 30 0
In the absence of legislative guidance, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has specifically held that considerations of marital fault have no
place in the property distribution process. 30 1 In Chalmers v. Chalmers, 30 2 the court explained this position by stating that "fault may
be merely a manifestation of a sick marriage" and that, in any event,
it is often difficult to assess responsibility for the breakup. 30 3 Also,
and more importantly, the court recognized that the doctrine of
equitable distribution assumes that both parties have contributed
equally to the marriage and that all property acquired during marriage should be shared equally after the divorce. 30 4 The reader
should be aware that this definition is broader than Pennsylvania's
30 5
which contains specific statutory exclusions.
b. The Case Law
Because of the lack of detail in the New Jersey statute, 30 6 case
law has played a significant role in the development of the law of
297. See 65 N.J. at 212, 320 A.2d at 492, quoting UNIFORM MARRIAGE XND DIVORCE ACT §
307, reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 143 (1979). This section provides that four factors
are pertinent in the property distribution determination:

(1) contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family hone or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 143

(1979).
298. 65 N.J. at 212, 320 A.2d at 492.
299. 1d. at 217, 320 A.2d at 495.
300. Id. at 217-18, 320 A.2d at 495.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 193, 320 A.2d 478, 482 (1974).
65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974).
Id. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482.
Id. at 194, 320 A.2d at 493.
See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
See Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 209, 320 A.2d 484, 490 (1974) (statute authorizing

equitable distribution, though lacking in detail, is not unconstitutionally vague).
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equitable distribution in New Jersey. The nature of equitable distribution requires a judge to engage in a three-step procedure: first,
the court must identify the property available for distribution-i.e.,
the marital property; second, a value must be assigned to the prop30 7
erty; and third, the judge must arrive at an equitable allocation.
Problems may arise at each stage of the process, and it is instructive
to examine the New Jersey courts' handling of the more common
issues.
One of the more interesting problems which the New Jersey
courts have faced is that of assigning a value to the economic interests. When the property to be divided is subject to fluctuations in
value, the valuation date may be extraordinarily significant. While the
parties may, of course, stipulate to a valuation date, in the absence of
such a stipulation, the court will use the date the divorce action was
commenced to determine the value of the property. 308
The more difficult problem is the valuation of an interest which
has no readily discernable fair market value. Consider the issue faced
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Stern v. Stern30 9 where the
court had to determine the value of a divorced spouse's interest in a
law partnership, recognizing that the spouse intended to continue as
a member of the firm. 310 The court determined that the measure of
the partner's interest was that sum which would have gone to his
estate pursuant to the partnership agreement if he had died. 3 11 The
court stated:
Generally speaking the monetary worth of this type of professional partnership will consist of the total value of the partners'
.capital accounts, accounts receivable, the value of work in progress, any appreciation in the true worth of tangible personalty over
and above book value, together with good will, should there in fact
be any; the total so arrived at to be diminished by the amount of
accounts payable as well as any other liabilities not reflected on the
3 12
partnership books.
307. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (1974).
308. Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 292, 285 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1978).
309. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
310. Id. at 345, 331 A.2d at 360. If the spouse did not intend to continue as a partner, there
would be no valuation problem for the value of the interest would be that sum paid to the
partner upon his or her withdrawal.
311. Id. at 346, 331 A.2d at 360.
312. Id. at 346-47, 331 A.2d at 261 (footnotes omitted). The court rejected an argument made

bv the defendant that the accounts receivable should not be included in the valuation because
they are not vested rights. See id. at 348, 331 A.2d at 261-62. In rejecting this contention, the
court stated that the concept of "vesting" is best left in the law of future interests and it "should
probably find no significant place in the developing law of equitable distribution." Id., 331 A.2d
at 262. Significantly, however, the court left open the question of what future interests may be
considered marital property-an area where the concept of vesting may play a crucial role. Id.
at 348-49, 331 A.2d at 262.
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The court further stated that if a partnership agreement contains a
stated sum payable to a partner's estate upon death then presumptively that sum, plus the value of the partner's interest above stated
capital, is the value of the interest upon divorce. 3 13 The presumption is rebuttable, however, upon a showing that the stated figure has
not been periodically updated to show increases in value or that the
314
books of the partnership are not well kept.
The New Jersey Superior Court faced a similar problem in the
case of Lavene v. Lavene, 315 wherein the court was required to place
a value upon a spouse's interest in a closely held corporation. 3 16 In
Lavene, the court recognized that, in assessing this type of property,
"[e]ach case presents a unique factual question" which cannot be
solved by rigid adherence to mathematics.3 17 The court thus opined
that the method of valuation of close corporations used by the Internal Revenue Service for estate and gift tax purposes 3 18 is equally
applicable in the equitable distribution context. 3 1 9 It should be
noted that the federal tax approach to valuation of close corporations
is a multifactored, nonrigid method.3 20 Therefore, in both Lavene
and Stern, the courts involved used all relevant factors in determining the valuation of interests which did not have a stated fair market
value.
Another interesting problem that has arisen in New Jersey is the
effect of a judgment lien held by a third party which has attached to
one of the spouses' interests in the marital property. In Sisco v. New
Jersey Bank, 3 2 1 title to the marital home was held by the en313. Id. at 346, 331 A.2d at 260.
314. Id. at 346-47, 331 A.2d at 261.
315. 162 N.J. Super. 187, 392 A.2d 621 (1978).

316. Id. at 192-203, 392 A.2d at 623-29. The defendant owned 42.8% of the outstanding stock
of the corporation. Id. at 192, 392 A.2d at 623.

317. Id. at 193, 392 A.2d at 624.
318. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, modified, Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370,
amplified, Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319. The eight factors listed in Revenue Ruling 59-60
are:
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its inception.

(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific
industry in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity.
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value.
Sales of the stock and the size of the block to be valued.
The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of
business having their stocks actively traded in a free and open market, either on an
exchange or over-the-counter.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 4.01, 1959-1 C.B. 238-39.
319. 162 N.J. Super. at 195, 392 A.2d at 625.
320. See note 318 supra.
321. 158 N.J. Super. 111, 385 A.2d 890 (1978).
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tirety. 322 The parties were divorced and the decree provided that
the home should be sold with 60% of the proceeds accruing to the
wife and 40% to the husband.3 23 The court also ordered that certain
indebtedness, including accrued support payments, be paid out of the
husband's 40% share. 324 On March 21, 1977, the defendant-bank
obtained a judgment against the husband and levied on all of his interest in the marital property. 325 The wife, of course, claimed priority over the bank's lien. 326 The lower court held that she had such
priority with respect to both her 60% interest in the property and the
accrued indebtedness which was to be paid from the husband's 40%
share. 327
On appeal, the Superior Court determined that the original divorce decree's order as to the indebtedness created only a money
judgment in favor of the wife, and therefore, since the bank was first
to execute, it had priority over any sums gained from the husband's
40% interest. 3 28 The court also determined, however, that the divorce decree gave the wife an undivided 60% equitable interest in
the proceeds of the marital home. 32 9 Applying the rule that a legal
lien can only bind the actual interest of the debtor, the court stated
that the wife's 60% interest was not subject to the bank's lien and,
hence, all that the bank could levy on was the husband's 40%
share.330

Thus, Sisco apparently holds that equitable distribution effectuates a partition of jointly held marital property with each spouse's
share subject to execution by his or her own creditors but immune
from execution by the other spouse's creditors. Sisco also illustrates a
fundamental point in an equitable distribution system: the irrelevancy
of who has title. Remember that the marital home in Sisco was held
by the entirety. 33 1 At common law, divorce destroyed this estate
creating in its stead a tenancy in common which gave each spouse a
one-half interest in the property. 33 2 Under equitable distribution,
while the tenancy by the entirety is still destroyed, on divorce the
parties' share of the property is determined according to all relevant

322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 114, 385 A.2d at 891.
Id.
ld.
Id.

326. Id. at 115, 385 A.2d at 891.
327. Id. at 116, 385 A.2d at 892.
328. Id. at 119-20, 385 A.2d at 894.
329. Id. at 123, 385 A.2d at 895.

330. Id.
331. See text accompanying note 322 supra.
332.

See

C.J.

MOYNIIIAN,

INTRODUCTION

TO l"11

LAWV OF REAL PROPErY 232 (1962).
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factors. For example, in Sisco, the wife's share was 60% and the hus333
band's was 40%.
Identifying what constitutes "marital property" has also been addressed by the New Jersey courts. We have already indicated that
interests in professional partnerships 334 and close corporations 33 are
considered marital property. Additionally, the New Jersey courts
have determined that an increase in the value of property acquired
by one of the spouses prior to marriage becomes marital property if
the increase in value is attributable to the contributions of both
spouses. 33 6 Because the increase must be due to the contribution of
both spouses, increases in value due to inflation or other economic
factors are not considered marital property in New Jersey. 33 7 Compare this with the Pennsylvania Code which recognizes that an increase in value to premarital property is marital property. 338 The
Pennsylvania statute makes no distinction on its face between inflationary increases in value and increases due to other factors.
Pennsylvania courts when presented with the question would do well
to consider New Jersey's rejection of increases not directly related to
spousal efforts.
What is an "equitable" distribution is an unanswerable question
and will depend upon the facts of each case before the court. Yet the
New Jersey courts have been rather innovative in their approach to
this problem and have not hesitated to award numerically unequal
shares. 33 9 In one especially pragmatic decision, the court awarded
the wife the right to live in the marital residence. 3 40 However, because there was an insufficient amount of remaining assets to give the
husband his fair share, 34 1 the court directed the wife to give the husband a mortgage with interest and principal to be paid at a date des34 2
ignated in the future.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has articulated the public policy
considerations behind equitable distribution as being the furtherance

333. See text accompanying note 324 supra. See also Pascarella v. Pascarella, 165 N.J. Super.
558, 562, 398 A.2d 921, 923 (1979) (40% award of entireties property to wife was excessive on
the facts of the case).
334. See notes 309-14 and accompanying text supra.
335. See notes 315-19 and accompanying text supra.
336. Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J. Super. 5, 7, 370 A.2d 509, 510 (1977).
337. Id. at 9, 370 A.2d at 509.
338. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401 (e)(1), (3).
339. See, e.g., Pascarella v. Pascarella, 165 N.J. Super, 558, 562, 398 A.2d 921, 923 (1970);

Sisco v. New Jersey Bank, 158 N.J. Super. 111, 114, 385 A.2d 890, 891 (1978).
340. See Gemigrani v. Gemigrani, 146 N.J. Super. 278, 284, 369 A.2d 942, 945 (1977).
341. Id. at 282, 369 A.2d at 944.
342. Id. at 284, 369 A.2d at 945.
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of the financial welfhre of' a dependent spouse and a recognition of
that spouse's contributions to the economic efficacy of the marriage.3 4 3 The policy considerations in the Pennsylvania Code imply a
similar approach.344
2. Delaware
a. The Statute
The Delaware Act provides for equitable distribution of marital
property upon request of the parties, without regard to marital misconduct. 345 The statute includes a list of eleven factors which are to
be considered in making an equitable distribution. 34 6 In this respect, the Delaware provision is more inclusive than the New Jersey
statute which includes no guidelines, 34 7 and thus, the Delaware law
is similar to that of Pennsylvania.3 4 8 In addition, the Delaware statuite gives a reasonably detailed definition of marital property: "[AIlI
property acquired by either party subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) [p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the
marriage; (2) [p]roperty excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
and (3) [tlhe increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage." 34 9 Furthermore, the statute expressly states that regardless
of who holds title, property acquired during the marriage is pre350
sumed to be marital property.

343. See Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 228-29, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974).
344. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102; notes 287-88 and accompanying text supra.
345. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (Michie Supp. 1978).
346. Id. § 1513(a). The court is to consider "all relevant factors" including 1) the length of the
marriage; 2) any prior marriage of the party; 3) the age, health, station, amount and sources of
income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; 4)
whether the property award is in lieu of or in addition to alimony; 5) the opportunity of each for
future acquisitions of capital assests and income; 6) the contribution or dissipation of each party
in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation of the marital property, including
the contribution of a party as homemaker or husband; 7) the value of the property set apart to
each party; 8) the economic circumstances of each part%, at the time the division of property is
to become effective, taking into account the desirability of awarding the family home or the
right to live therein for reasonable periods to the party with whom any children of' the marriage
will live; 9) whether the property was acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent; 10) the
debts of the parties; and 11) tax consequences. Id.

347. For a discussion of New Jersey's equitable distribution law, see notes 291-343 and accompanying text supra.
348. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's equitable distribution law, see notes 63-79 and accompanying text supra.
349. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b) (Michie Supp. 1978).
350. Id. § 1513(c). The presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the property falls
within one of the categories listed in text accompanying note 349 supra. See id.
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1). The Case Law
The relative explicitness of' the definition of marital property in
the Delaware Act has ha( the beneficial result of' minimizing litigation
concerning this issue. Nonetheless, the courts have been called upon
to answer a number of' questions in this area. For example, in Wife J.
v. Husband J.,351 the Delaware Superior Court was presented with
the question of' when marriage terminates ftor purposes of defining
marital property In this case, the wife received the proceeds of a life
insurance policy after the filing of the complaint but before the rendering of' a final decree. 35 2 The court held that "in the absence of
unfair tactics by the other spouse, property received by a spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to the divorce decree is marital
property." 353

The Pennsylvania Code would seem to dictate a result contrary
to the Delaware court's holding in Wife J. because property acquired
after separation is excluded from the Code's definition of* marital
property. 35 4 It is not clear, however, if' the Pennsylvania statute
excludes post-separation increases in value as in the situation where
an asset has been defined as marital property and assigned a value at
a hearing but then increases in value prior to the issuance of a decree. The new Code's provisions are seemingly in conflict on this
issue. On the one hand, the Code provides that increases in value to
property during the marriage are marital property 3 55 yet, on the
other hand, the Code excludes post-separation acquisitions. 356 It is
possible that the Pennsylvania courts can avoid this conflict by interpreting the post-separation acquisition provision as not encompassing
post-separation increases in value when the underlying asset was acquired prior to the separation. The Delaware Supreme Court has
held in this regard that, upon a showing of a substantial post-hearing
change in value to marital property, the court should revalue the
3 57
property.

351. 367 A.2d 655 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976).
352. Id. at 656.

353. Id. at 657. The court reasoned that since other marital obligations, such as support or
alimoO"N pen(lente lite,
continue untila finmldecree is rendered, there was no justification for
applying a different rule ini equitable distribution context. Id.

354. See DivoRCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(e)(4).
355. 1I.§ 401(e).
356. Id.§ 401(e)(4).
357. See Wife,F. v. Husband F., 358 A.2d 714, 716 (Del. 1976) (per curiam). In Wife F., the
asset involved was a retail liquor store. Id. The lower court valued the busilness at $26,722. Id.
Subsequent to this valuation, but prior to the rendering of the decree, the husband entered into
an agreement to sell the business for $100,000. Id. The lower court refused to revalue the asset.
Id. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, stating that, while "not everN' post-
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The Delawae Supreme Court faced an interesting marital property classification problem in J.D.P. v. F.J.H. "I In this case, the
husband was the controlling stockholder in two Delaware corporations
which were acquired prior to marriage and thus were not marital
property under Delaware law. 35 9 The question arose, however, as to
how increases in the value of these interests attributable to the corporations' retained earnings should be classified. 360 The court rejected
the husband's argument that these increases should be excluded and
held that "an increase 'during the marriage of retained earnings of a
corporation controlled by a spouse may be included in the calculation
of the couple's marital property."361 The court maintained that to
hold otherwise would give one spouse the ability, through corporate
36 2
control, to insulate assets from equitable distribution.
What constitutes an equitable distribution is within the court's
discretion, subject to the statutory guidelines. 363 Thus, there is no
requirement that the property be divided equally. 364 Despite the
discretionary nature of the process, the Delaware Supreme Court has
implied that the lower court must develop a sufficient record to allow
appellate courts to determine if the statutory criteria are being
3 65
applied correctly or if the lower court is abusing its discretion.
In exercising its discretion, the trial court must take into account
legal interests in the marital property. For example, in Wife (L.R.) v.
Hlusband (N.G.),366 the lower court awarded the wife only twenty-

five percent of the property which the parties held as tenants by the
entirety, justifying its action on the following grounds: 1) the marriage
was relatively short; and 2) the wife had taken some marital assets. 3 67 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the

hearing change in asset value requires reexamination, . . . the difference here was so substantial
that the Court . . . should have determined to what extent . . . the sale price required a change
in its award." Id.

358. 399 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979).
359. Id. at 209. It should be noted that, whereas the Pennsylvania Code specifically includes
increases in value to premarital property within its definition of marital property, the Delaware
Code expressly excludes such increases. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(3) (Supp.
1978) with DI'ORCE CODE § 401(e)(1), (3). Nevertheless, the J.D.P. court's decision is of interest for Pennsylvania considering the equitable nature of its approach. See notes 360-62 and
accompanying text infra.
360. 399 A.2d at 209. The court defined "retained earnings" as "'net income which would be

available for distribution as dividends." Id. at 210 n.1.
361. Id. at 211 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 210.
Wife B. v. Husband B., 395 A.2d 358, 359 (Del. 1978).
Husband B. v. Wife B., 396 A.2d 169, 172 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978).
See Wife (L.R.) v. Husband (N.G.), 406 A 2d 34, 35 (Del. 1979) (per curiam).

366. 406 A.2d 34 (Del. 1979) (per curiam).

367. Id. at 35.
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record was insufficient to determine if the lower court had abused its
discretion because no values had been assigned to the marital property removed by the wife. 36 8 The court also held that the duration of
the marriage is not a relevant factor when dividing property held by
the entirety. 3 69 Since the wife had an undivided interest in the
property by nature of the tenancy by the entirety, the court opined
that "while the shortness of the marriage may be a persuasive factor
for limiting assignment of [the husband's] property to the wife, it
does not make sense to use it as a basis for divesting the wife of what
she has and giving it to the husband." 370 Thus, the court remanded
with instructions to the lower court to determine the nature and ori37 1
gin of the wife's interest.
The Delaware Supreme Court has also determined that a lower
court abused its discretion when it ordered a husband to obtain a life
insurance policy with the ex-wife as sole beneficiary. 3 72 The
Pennsylvania statute contains a similar rule which limits the court to
373
orders affecting policies acquired during the marriage.
Finally, the Delaware court has also indicated that trial courts
have no power to order one of the spouses to place marital property
in trust, stating that because the statute requires division of the property between the parties, it is impermissible to order a trust which
would grant rights in the property to someone other than the recipient spouse. 3 74 The Pennsylvania Code, like the Delaware Act, contains language to the effect that property shall be divided. 375 However, the Pennsylvania Code also gives courts handling matrimonial
causes broad equity powers, thus apparently granting them the power
3 76
to establish trusts.
3. Ohio
a. The Statute
The Ohio Act does not include an isolated provision addressing
equitable distribution. Instead, the court's jurisdiction over equitable
distribution of marital property in divorce actions stems from two
368. 1d.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See Husband B.W.D. v. Wife B.A.D., 405 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1979).
373.
374.
tit. 13,
375.

See DiVORcE, ComE, supra note 1, § 401(i).
Husband C. v. Wife C., 391 A.2d 745, 746 (Del. 1978), interpreting DEL, CODE ANN.
§ 1502 (Michie Supp. 1978).
See Div)HCE Co -.,, supra note 1, § 401(d).

376. See id. § 401(c).
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separate statutes. 3 7 7 Under the first, the court is empowered to
award alimony in the form of real or personal property or both, or to
award a sum of money to be paid either in a lump sum or in installments.3 78 This kind of distribution of property will be governed by
the factors set forth in the statute to be considered in the award of
alimony. 3 79 The second statute, which may be construed as giving
the court the power to equitably divide, is a general grant of full
equity power and jurisdiction to courts hearing domestic relations
matters. 380 This permits property to be distributed independently of
any alimony award. 3 81 Additionally, when there is a property settlement agreement pendent to a marital dissolution, the court must
3 82
approve the agreement prior to entering a decree.
b. The Case Law
The Ohio requirement of a property settlement agreement as a
prerequisite to a no-fault marital dissolution383 has resulted in a
simplified property distribution procedure as compared to that of
New Jersey or Delaware. The court will approve such an agreement
if it is "fair, just and equitable,"384 but if "the spouse in the poorest
position to strike a bargain for himself" is unrepresented by counsel
and the agreement is inequitable, the court may set it aside.3 85 Alternative!y, instead of setting aside the agreement completely, the
court may, at the parties' option, modify it. 8 6
377.
378.
379.
380.

Se OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.18(A), .011 (Anderson 1980).
Id. § 3105.18(A).
See id.; notes 228-47 and accompanying text supra.
OHIO RE'. CODE ANN. § 3105.011 (Anderson 1980). The section reads:
The court of common pleas including divisions of courts of domestic relations, has full
equitable powers cind jurisdiction appropriate to the determination of all domestic relations matters. This section is not a determination by the general assembly that such
equitable powers and jurisdiction do not exist with respect to any such matter.
Id. In the absence of statutory authorization, courts have no jurisdiction over divorce, property
distribution, or alimony actions which were unknown at common law. Soyk v. Soyk, 45 Ohio
App. 2d 319, 321, 345 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1975). Therefore, in 1951, a provision conferring equity
powers and jurisdiction on the courts in domestic relations cases was passed, allowing for property distribution absent alimony. Id. Upon repeal of this provision in 1971, the courts 'were
without authority to distribute property unless it-the distribution-was pursuant to an alimony
award. Id. at 322, 345 N.E.2d at 464. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1980).
In 1975, § 3105.011 became effective and the courts regained the authority to distribute property independently of an alimony award. Id. § 3105.011.
381. See Sovk v. Soyk, 45 Ohio App. 2d 319, 321, 345 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1975).
382. For a discussion of Ohio's marital dissolution procedure, see notes 125-49 and accompanying text supra.
383. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.63 (Anderson 1980); note 128 and accompanying text

supra.
384. Popovic v. Popovic, 45 Ohio App. 2d 57, 63-64, 341 N.E.2d 341, 346 (1975).
385. See In re Kessler, 58 Ohio Misc. 33, 40-41, 392 N.E.2d 905, 910-11 (C.P. 1978).
386. See id. at 42, 392 N.E.2d at 911.
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Even though distribution of property is often accomplished
through application of the factors in the Ohio alimony statute (because of the jurisdictional necessity of relying, in part, on the alimony
section),3 87 it has been held that nonperiodic, property alimony in
Ohio is generally not subject to future modification. 388 It should also
be noted that marital misconduct is not a controlling factor in property distribution in Ohio, 3 89 although some cases indicate that it may
390
be a relevant factor affecting the court's discretion.
4. Summary of the Equitable Distributiot Laws in Neighboring
States
The experiences of neighboring states with respect to equitable
distribution of marital property gives some clue as to tile future of
equitable distribution in Pennsylvania. While the statutory provisions
limit and guide the judiciary in the identification and valuation of the
marital assets, it is clear from the experiences of New Jersey, Ohio,
and Delaware that the word "equitable" provides the element of flexibility which courts require if they are to deal with the parties in a
fair and just manner. It is hoped that judicial interpretation of' the
equitable distribution provisions in tile Pennsylvania Code will provide a similar fair and just distribution of' marital assets in Pennsylvania.
IV. CONCLUSION

We have presented this analysis of' the Pennsylvania Divorce
Code and this brief survey of the divorce laws of' the states of' New
Jersey, Ohio, and Delaware under no illusion that all questions which
will arise under the new Code will be answered by looking to our
sister states. It was our intention, however, to try to illuminate
through this survey some of the more pertinent and common problem
areas which have arisen in those states and which very, likely will
arise in Pennsylvania. While the decisions of' these contiguous jurisdictions do not always comport with our- idea of how the Pennsylvania
system ought to operate, they are all invaluable source of alternatives
which can be applied to the many complex problems which may now
arise in the area of family law in Pennsylvania.
387, For a discussion of this jurisdictional mechanism, see notes 377-81 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of the Ohio alimony statute, see notes 228-52 and accompanying

text supra.
388. See Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499, 507, 3 N.E. 354, 356 (1885).
389. See, e.g.. Gage v. Gage, 165 Ohio St. 462, 464-65, 136 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1956).
390. See Esteb v. Esteb, 173 Ohio St. 259, 262-63, 181 N.E.2d 462, 464 (1962).
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In summary, the law of divorce, alimony, and property distribution in Pennsylvania has entered the modern world after a long history of obstinate legislative adherence to stereotypical notions of the
family. We are certain that the new Code will put an end to many3 of
the draconian results which were prevalent under the old law. '
We hope that the Pennsylvania courts will liberally interpret the new
Act so that the progressive notions of modern-day family life, which
are fundamental policies of the Code, 392 wNill be furthered.

391. See notes 11-25, 56-62 & 80-85 and accompanying text supra.
392. See DIvI CE CODE, supra note 1, § 102.
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